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Abstract
With the proliferation of investor-state treaty arbitration, international investment
law has been increasingly caught in a “legitimacy” crisis, with concerns looming large
over resultant disruptive effects on human rights. Amid existing scholarship seeking to
recalibrate the balance between investment protection and public interests, what is
relatively undertheorized is a public international law dimension. In this regard, this
Article explores the role of human rights law in integrating human rights considerations
into investment tribunals’ decision-making, bridging the normative divide between
international investment law and human rights. It makes three contributions. First, it
systemizes the normative tensions and potential conflicts between international investment
law and human rights, analyzing the primary manifestations and root causes thereof.
Second, from the position of a respondent state, this Article typologizes the application of
human rights law to investor-state treaty disputes, providing legal grounds to alleviate the
potential conflicts between investment protection and human rights. In so doing, it also
provides a clearer clarification of the relationship between international investment law
and human rights law. Third, this Article evaluates the relative strengths and weaknesses
of these human rights arguments, shedding light on how international investment
agreements could be reformed to better balance investment protection with noneconomic
issues.

* Raymond Yang Gao, Global Academic Fellow, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong
Kong; PHD Scholar, RegNet, Australian National University; Attorney-at-Law (New York);
LLM in International Legal Studies, New York University School of Law. An earlier draft of
this paper was presented at the 2019 PluriCourts Workshop “Investment Arbitration and
Human Rights: The Legitimate Role for Investment Law and Arbitration in Protecting Human
Rights” in Oslo, Norway and at the 2021 CIBEL Global Young Scholars Workshop
“Challenges and Opportunities in International Dispute Settlement Mechanism” in Sydney,
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I. INTRODUCTION
International investment agreements (IIAs) are international treaties that
provide substantive protections and procedural rights to foreign investors and
investments—including, most notably, the right to bring international arbitral
claims against the host state for monetary compensations arising from
breaches of investment protection obligations.1 In recent decades, investment
treaty arbitration has evolved from a rather peripheral area to a most vibrant
dispute settlement mechanism of international law. With the sharp increase
of IIAs and investor-state treaty arbitration, arbitral tribunals are facing more
complex legal questions when assessing the compliance of regulatory
measures with an IIA. Such a dispute could become highly controversial,
when a foreign investor challenges regulatory measures adopted to promote
and protect human rights, or when a respondent state raises defenses or
claims that the conduct of the investor breaches human rights norms.2 These
human rights include: (i) first-generation rights of civil and political liberties
(contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)); (ii) secondgeneration rights, which include economic, social and cultural rights
(provided in the UDHR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)), core labor standards, and indigenous
people’s rights; and (iii) third-generation rights, such as the emerging rights
to a clean and healthy environment and economic development.3
1 Jason Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV. INT’L
L. J. 392, 392 (2012); see Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral
Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 631-32 (1998).
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While the language of new-generation IIAs has become more
sophisticated and balanced over time, most existing investor-state
arbitrations are premised on older-generation IIAs.4 However, the majority
of the latter generally contain no reference to human rights in their texts.5
Rather, they typically use terse, broadly-worded, and open-textured language
to define core concepts of investments protection, remaining silent on how

2 Bruno Simma & Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and International
Human Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 678, 678-79 (Christina
Binder et al. eds., 2009); UNCTAD, Selected Recent Developments in IIA Arbitration and
Human Rights, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/7, at 2-3, 12 (2009), https://unctad.org/en/
Docs/webdiaeia20097_en.pdf; Tomoko Ishikawa, Counterclaims and the Rule of Law in
Investment Arbitration, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 33, 33 (2019).
3 UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 12; James Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment
Arbitration—Evidence of International Law’s Unity, 18 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L. 77, 80 n. 13
(2007) (noting that these rights are three “generations of human rights,” with each “having a
different level of acceptance in the international community”); see MANFRED NOWAK,
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 23-25 (2003). On the
right to environment, see Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Environmental Degradation, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 596-99 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 2014).
4 See, e.g., UNCTAD, REVIEW OF ISDS DECISIONS IN 2019: SELECTED IIA REFORM
ISSUES 1 (2009), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaepcbinf2021d1_en.pdf
(“Most arbitral decisions rendered in 2019 concerned cases that were based on provisions in
old-generation treaties signed in the 1990s or earlier.”).
5 Barnali Choudhury, Investor Obligations for Human Rights, 35 ICSID REVIEW 82, 86,
87 (2020); Clara Reiner & Christoph Schreuer, Human Rights in International Investment Law
and Arbitration, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION
84 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Francesco Francioni eds., 2009). ERIC
DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
129 (2014). For instance, major multilateral investment treaties, such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement’s investment chapter and the Energy Charter Treaty, make no mention
of human rights in their texts.
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to balance investment protection with noneconomic issues.6 For a long time,
conventional wisdom held that international investment law and international
human rights law were separate branches of international law without
substantial overlap.7 Though investor-state tribunals have not turned a blind
eye to external rules of public international law, a “disintegrative inclination”
had long prevailed among adjudicators in investment treaty arbitration,
which became more prominent with respect to rules in more specialized
fields of international law—particularly international human rights law.8
That is, investment tribunals generally showed reluctance to engage
with human rights considerations. In investment awards, tribunals’
references to human rights of those who may be adversely impacted by
foreign investments are rare and unusual; in contrast, most of their
substantive references to human rights concern investors’ “human rights,”
employing human rights law as supplementary interpretive tools to inform
and strengthen the interpretation of investors’ rights.9 To the extent that
tribunals considered the human rights of the affected local population,
arbitrators oftentimes acknowledged the relevance of such noneconomic
issues in abstracto before disregarding, sidestepping, or discounting them in
their analyses in concreto.10 In its extreme form, this approach tends to regard
6 UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 3; see also Silke Elrifai, Equity-Based Discretion at the
Anatomy of Damages Assessment in Investment Treaty Law, 34 J. INT’L ARB. 835, 836 (2017).
7 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Unification Rather than Fragmentation of International Law? The
Case of International Investment Law and Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION, supra note 5, at 45; see Simma & Kill,
supra note 2, at 679.
8 Moshe Hirsch, Conflicting Obligations in International Investment Law: Investment
Tribunals’ Perspective, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 331 (Tomer Broude & Yuval
Shany eds., 2008); Simma & Kill, supra note 2, at 679.
9 Tomer Broude & Caroline Henckels, Not All Rights Are Created Equal: A Loss-Gain
Frame of Investor Rights and Human Rights, 34 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 93, 94, 100, 101 (2021)
(“[I]t appears that investment arbitrators are far from unaware of international and regional
human rights implications for investment law, and they are prepared to revert to them in the
context of supporting investor rights.”); BRABANDERE, supra note 5, at 129-30 (“[M]any
(investment) arbitral tribunals have, despite their reluctance to assess human rights
considerations raised as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, in fact relied on the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in determining whether the
rights of the investor have been breached. . . . [Investment tribunals’] references to human
rights courts’ decisions, most often in assessing whether or not an expropriation has taken
place, . . . show not only the close relation between both branches of law, but also the fact that
arbitral tribunals can as a matter of principle consider human rights [law].”).
10 Barnali Choudhury, International Investment Law and Noneconomic Issues, 53 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1, 15-16 (2020). BRABANDERE, supra note 5, at 129 (noting that investment
tribunals “remain relatively reluctant to engage in human rights arguments brought by one of
the parties, despite the sometimes obvious relevance of human rights issues and the general
importance of human rights compliance by host states”); Ionna Knoll-Tudor, The Fair and
Equitable Treatment Standard and Human Rights Norms, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION, supra note 5, at 339-40.
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investment treaty arbitration as a somehow depoliticized, self-contained
regime: as it is “splendidly isolated from the dynamics and tensions of the
rest of the legal universe,” international investment law should remain
relatively immune from the influence of non-investment legal norms,
particularly human rights law.11
Concerns were expressed that by downplaying or dismissing
noneconomic issues, investment treaty arbitration would impinge on human
rights, public health, and environment protection, and unduly constrain a host
state’s right to regulate, making international investment law a threat to
sustainable development.12 As such, the normative tensions and potential
conflicts between international investment law and international human
rights law, as two seemingly segmented branches of international law,
manifest prominently in investment treaty arbitration, plaguing the
legitimacy of international investment law as a whole.13
Such normative tensions become even more problematic in the current
global COVID-19 pandemic. Given that many countries have enacted a
variety of emergency regulatory measures to contain, mitigate, and respond
to the spread of COVID-19, investor-state treaty claims may be on the rise.14
As such, striking a proper balance between investment protection and public
interests obtains new significance and becomes more pressing.
In the “hard-case” scenarios where the underlying IIAs have not dealt
with human rights, how to appropriately address such non-economic issues
becomes more important. While in recent years the intersection between
international investment law and human rights has attracted growing
attention, investment tribunals are still in search of a proper framework to
bridge the normative divide in international investment law. Though more
than a decade old, the observation that “connecting human rights
considerations to investment arbitration is still in its infancy” might still hold
true even today.15 Thus far, commentaries have been increasingly coalesced
11 Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 ICLQ
573, 576 (2011); see Fabio Santacroce, The Applicability of Human Rights Law in
International Investment Disputes, 34 ICSID REV. 136, 140 (2019).
12 See, e.g., Choudhury, supra note 10, at 1; Choudhury, supra note 5, at 86-87.
13 Mehmet Toral & Thomas Schultz, The State, a Perpetual Respondent in Investment
Arbitration? Some Unorthodox Considerations, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 577, 589 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (arguing
that the current investor-state arbitration system “seems to be leaning toward separation of
human rights and investor’s rights like oil and water”); see also Simma, supra note 11, at 573.
14 Lucas Bento & Jingtian Chen, Investment Treaty Claims in Pandemic Times: Potential
Claims and Defenses, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 8, 2020), http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2020/04/08/investment-treaty-claims-in-pandemic-times-potentialclaims-and-defenses/.
15 See Jasper Krommendijk & John Morijn, “Proportional” by What Measure(s)?
Balancing Investor Interests and Human Rights by Way of Applying the Proportionality
Principle in Investor-State Arbitration, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND ARBITRATION, supra note 5, at 446.
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around a constellation of “public law” prescriptions—most notably, a
proportionality test, standards of review (or the notion of deference), and
public law analogies and principles developed under domestic law—to
recalibrate the balance between investment protection and public interests.16
By comparison, what is relatively undertheorized is a public international law
dimension.
Founded on IIAs that provide the consent of states to arbitration and
which are public international law instruments themselves, investor-state
treaty disputes are fundamentally concerned with states’ international legal
obligations and responsibilities under public international law.17 In essence,
investment treaty arbitration is a dispute settlement model embedded in
public international law as the background normative framework.18 In
principle, the applicable law governing the merits of an investor-state treaty
dispute includes public international law, which encompasses international
human rights law.19 Could human rights law itself play a role in addressing
the normative divide between international investment law and human
rights? What are the relative strengths and weakness of these human rights
arguments, and what insights does this approach bring on how best to reform
IIAs?
From the position of a respondent state (i.e., the host state), this Article
explores the role of human rights law in integrating human rights
considerations into investment tribunals’ decision-making. When human
rights law directly applies to the substance of the disputes, it could be invoked
to ground an affirmative defense against state liability or a counterclaim to
enforce investor responsibilities. In parallel, in treaty interpretation, human
rights law could indirectly function as a source of interpretive aid, enabling
Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment
Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L. L. 45, 47, 66-67 (2013); José E. Alvarez, Is Investor-State
Arbitration Public?, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 534, 537-40 (2016); José E. Alvarez,
Beware: Boundary Crossings—A Critical Appraisal of Public Law Approaches to
International Investment Law, 17 JWIT 171, 188-91 (2016). For scholarship delving into these
“public law” prescriptions, see, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State
Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging
Global Administrative Law, IILJ WORKING PAPER 2009/6, https://iilj.org/wp- content/
uploads/2016/08/Kingsbury-Schill-Investor-State-Arbitration-as-Governance-IILJ- WP2009_6-GAL.pdf; Stephan Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: ReConceptualizing Standard of Review, 3 J. INT.’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577 (2012); William
Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard
of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 282 (2010); Alex Stone Sweet &
Giacinto Della Canadea, Proportionality, General Principles of Law, and Investor-State
Arbitration: A Response to Jose Alvarez, 46 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 911 (2014); Stephan
Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law—An Introduction, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 3, 29-35 (Stephan Schill
ed., 2010).
17 BRABANDERE, supra note 5, at 1-2, 11; Roberts, supra note 16, at 60-63, 68.
18 BRABANDERE, supra note 5, at 2.
19 See infra Section III.A.
16
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tribunals to engage in “systemic integration” to construe an IIA provision in
harmony with a state’s human rights obligations. Either independently or
cumulatively, these grounds could license investor-state tribunals to
accommodate human rights interests implicated, address investor misconduct
with respect to human rights, or consult relevant human rights law as an
interpretive tool. In this way, even absent explicit treaty language on human
rights, human rights law could help to alleviate the normative conflicts
between investment protection and human rights, enhancing the legitimacy
and rule-of-law attributes of international investment law.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the
normative tensions and potential conflicts between international investment
law and human rights. Part III delves into the application of international
human rights law to investor-state treaty disputes, and develops a typology
of human rights arguments. Part IV evaluates the pros and cons of this
approach, and looks to new IIA provisions for potential solutions. Part V
draws concluding remarks.
II. THE NORMATIVE CONFLICTS BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
This Part sets the stage for the discussion. Section A reviews major
manifestations of the so-called “normative conflicts” between international
investment law and human rights. Section B analyzes the underlying reasons
that cause or aggravate such normative conflicts. Section C then briefly posits
a judicial approach based on international human rights law to bridge the
normative divide, and discusses the jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals to
consider human rights in investment treaty arbitration.
A. A Case of “Normative Conflicts”?
Amid a growing backlash, investment treaty arbitration has increasingly
been caught in a legitimacy crisis. Among various critiques mounted, a vocal
strand stands out that centers on the normative tensions and potential
conflicts between international investment law and human rights.20 Concerns
were widely expressed that with the growing invocations of investor-state
treaty arbitration, it has increasingly become the case that a host state’s
human rights-motivated regulatory measures would be challenged by a
foreign investor before an international arbitral tribunal.21 This can result in
20 See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 455-68 (2011).
21 See, e.g., Choudhury, supra note 5, at 86 (noting that “[a]s the UN Special Rapporteur
on Business and Human Rights has observed, the expanding legal rights of firms and foreign
investors have created ‘instances of imbalances between firms and States that may be
detrimental to human rights’ since IIAs enable ‘investors to take host States to binding
international arbitration . . . for . . . damages resulting from . . . legislation to improve domestic
social and environmental standards’”); Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the
International Investment Regime—31 August 2010, YORK U., http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/
public-statement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010.
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significant detrimental impacts on human rights on three major fronts.
First, invocations of investment arbitration under an IIA may prevent a
host state from adopting measures that are necessary to fulfill, protect and
promote “widely accepted human rights values or obligations.”22 Since an
IIA empowers a foreign investor to directly bring a host state to binding
international arbitration to challenge domestic measures regulating public
welfare, investment treaty arbitration may create “instances of imbalances”
detrimental to human rights.23 As noted by Barnali Choudhury:
Investors have used investment arbitration to challenge a State’s
racial discrimination redress policies (i.e., affirmative actions
programmes designed to promote racial equality); measures used
to address the human rights implications arising out of a financial
crisis; measures designed to ensure citizens’ right to water;
measures used to reduce citizens’ tobacco consumption; measures
designed to protect indigenous rights; measures intended to protect
cultural rights; and measures designed to protect public health . . .
[as well as] environmental measures.24
As a result, a host state is often mired in a legal dilemma: it typically
has to choose between its IIA obligations and human rights commitments.25
Had it opted to regulate human rights, the state may be brought to investorstate treaty arbitrations that increasingly result in costly damage awards.
Should the state choose to honor its IIA commitments, this can deter the
government from pursuing remedial regulatory measures designed to further
human rights. Often characterized by a tough binary choice as such, this
dilemma reveals the normative tensions and potential conflicts between
investment treaty arbitration and human rights (particularly, the evolving set
of positive international obligations under the ICESCR).
Notably, investment treaty arbitration may interfere with a host state’s
sovereign right to regulate human rights, resulting in “regulatory chill.”26 For
states attempting to avoid undermining their international reputation by
breaching an IIA, paying out a large sum of monetary damages, and incurring
heavy arbitration fees and legal costs, binding, enforceable commitments
under IIAs to foreign investors may refrain the governments from adopting
welfare-enhancing regulatory measures.27 As such, investment treaty
arbitration could curtail the host states’ policy space to pursue human rights
ALVAREZ, supra note 20, at 458.
Choudhury, supra note 5, at 86.
24 Id.; see also ALVAREZ, supra note 20, at 458-59.
25 Choudhury, supra note 5, at 87.
26 ALVAREZ, supra note 20, at 459.
27 See Christian Bellak & Markus Leibrecht, Do Economic Crises Trigger Treaty-Based
Investor-State Arbitration Disputes?, 24 J. INT’L ECON. L. 127, 153 (2021).
22
23
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and public welfare. Alternatively, even without a formal IIA claim,
multinational corporations may leverage threats of investment treaty
arbitration to exert pressures on a host state during informal, confidential
negotiations, forcing the government to back off from regulatory measures
standing in the way of their commercial interests.28 In this way, investors
could delay, discourage or even thwart public interest-driven regulations.29
By strategically deploying investment treaty arbitration to secure favorable
yet undisclosed settlements from a state, foreign investors may end up
substantially adjusting the regulatory framework to their favor.30 Either way,
by increasing the risks and costs for regulatory interventions, investor-state
arbitration claims (or the threats thereof) could generate regulatory chill,
potentially impeding states’ regulatory initiatives aimed at regulating public
interests and advancing human rights.
The second major manifestation of such normative conflicts relates to
the “diversion effects” of investor-state arbitral awards. If an investor
prevailed on an IIA claim, the enormous amount of monetary compensations
awarded might significantly strain the material resources of a host state that
could have been used to further public interests and human rights.31 In this
regard, as commented on by Mark Chinen:
[w]hen a state has fewer resources and the award is high, it is
possible that its citizens will feel their impact . . . the direct and
indirect transfers a state makes in satisfaction of its horizontal
obligations to other states (or diagonal obligations in the case of
payments to private parties) may well interfere with its ability and
duty to meet its vertical obligations to its citizens. Monies paid to
satisfy an obligation to another state or the private parties
associated with the other state are monies that will not go towards
medical care, education, and the like, things that have been
recognized as international human rights or are emerging as
Choudhury, supra note 5, at 87; Kevin Gallagher, Investment Arbitration and
Developing Countries: A Re-Appraisal, GLOBAL DEV. ENV’T INST. WORKING PAPER NO.1101, at 8 (2011); Adam Bradlow, Human Rights Impact Litigation in ISDS: A Proposal for
Enabling Private Parties to Bring Human Rights Claims Through Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 355, 356 (2018).
29 Choudhury, supra note 5, at 5 (“New Zealand delayed the introduction of its tobacco
plain packaging laws until the Philip Morris arbitration on the same issue with Australia had
been decided, while Indonesia prevented its new environmental laws that banned open-pit
mining from applying to foreign investors when the investors threatened investment
arbitration.”).
30 Choudhury, supra note 5, at 87; Robert Howse, International Investment Law and
Arbitration: A Conceptual Framework, IILJ WORKING PAPER 2017/1, 60 (2017), https://www.
iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Howse_IILJ_2017_1-MegaReg.pdf.
31 See Mark Chinen, Complexity Theory and the Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of
State Responsibility, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 703 (2014).
28
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rights.32
Such a tension becomes all the more prominent for a developing country
with modest financial revenues or under a national emergency (such as an
economic crisis or a public health crisis).33 For less developed economies,
huge compensations awarded by an investment tribunal could impose a
substantial financial burden, straining their limited material resources to
regulate and promote public welfare.34 For instance, in a 2019 ICSID award
over a mining dispute, an investor-state tribunal ordered Pakistan to pay the
claimant investor USD 5.8 billion, which almost matched the USD 6 billion
loan offered by the IMF two months earlier to assist it to cope with an
economic crisis and which amounted to one-eighth of Pakistan’s total
governmental budget for 2019-2020.35
In particular, this tension would be exacerbated in an economic crisis.
However, economic crises are often the “situations when government
interventions in the market process are desirable from a social welfare
perspective,” creating strong demand for regulatory policy actions to contain
and combat the emergency. 36 Since emergency regulatory measures
addressing an economic crisis tend to be broad in scope and often cover the
whole economic sector (or even the entire economy), these regulations may
significantly affect a myriad of foreign investors, potentially triggering a
large number of investor-state treaty arbitrations.37 As a result, it is no
coincidence that IIAs are generally “more likely to be breached during major
[crises].”38 Such challenges become even more problematic in the current
global COVID-19 pandemic, given the potential investor-state treaty claims,
the public interests at large, and states’ diminished economic capacity.39
Id. at 707.
See Orhan Bayrak, Economic Crises and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances
in Investment Arbitration, 35 ICSID REV. 130, 130-31 (2020); for investment treaty
arbitrations brought against Argentina, see Investment Policy Hub, UNCTAD (2021),
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/country/8/argentina/investor.
34 Bellak & Leibrecht, supra note 27, at 128.
35 Kyla Tienhaara, World Bank Ruling Against Pakistan Shows Global Economic
Governance Is Broken, THE CONVERSATION (July 23, 2019), https://theconversation.com/worldbank-ruling-against-pakistan-shows-global-economic- governance-is-broken-120414; Elena
Mazneva et al., Barrick and Antofagasta Win $5.8 Billion Pakistan Ruling, BLOOMBERG
(July 15, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-15/antofagasta-jumps-on5-8-billion- damages-award-against-pakistan; see Tethyan Copper v. Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/12/1, Award, ¶ 1858 (Jul. 12, 2019).
36 Bellak & Leibrecht, supra note 27, at 129.
37 Id. at 132; see Bayrak, supra note 33, at 131.
38 Moshe Hirsch, Compliance with Investment Treaties: When Are States More Likely to
Breach or Comply with Investment Treaties?, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE
21ST CENTURY, supra note 2, at 869; Bellak & Leibrecht, supra note 27, at 152-53.
39 Martin Paparinskis, A Case Against Crippling Compensation in International Law of
32
33
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Third, while IIAs have created robust, enforceable rights for foreign
investors against a host state, there is no equivalent mechanism in investment
treaty arbitration to hold investors accountable for their wrongdoings in the
local communities. However, recent years have increasingly witnessed
“environmental disasters and human rights damages that are directly or
indirectly connected to investors’ misconduct.”40 In some instances, it is an
investor’s wrongdoings in terms of human rights and the environment that
provoked the measures of the host state challenged in investment treaty
arbitrations.41 When regulating such misconduct of foreign investors,
developing countries could be constrained by their inadequate domestic
judicial institutions, limited institutional capacity, and a lack of quality legal
services, such that their domestic legal and administrative institutions may
be unable to provide an effective legal remedy.42
To make things more complicated, a foreign investor is often able to
shield itself from claims levied against the misconduct of their local
enterprises or subsidiaries in the host state, due to “the principle of separate
corporate legal personality under domestic law.”43 Indeed, the “practice of
multinational corporations segregating potentially ‘risky’ activities through
corporate restructuring” in domestic law has long been controversial.44
However, investment treaty arbitration further aggravates the imbalance of
power between an investor and a host state, since its special arrangement of
shareholder claims for reflective loss enables a foreign investor to directly
claim for damages suffered by their local enterprises and investments,
without being held accountable for the latter’s misconduct.45
On the other hand, while the provisions of IIAs typically stipulate
investors’ various enforceable rights, they rarely create investor obligations
that could be enforced in investor-state arbitration, except for limited
outliers.46 At present, a majority of existing IIAs contain no provisions
imposing binding obligations or enforceable responsibilities on foreign
investors.47 Rather, as noted by commentators, provisions in IIAs that
State Responsibility, 83 MOD. L. REV. 1246, 1249 (2020).
40 Xuan Shao, Environmental and Human Rights Counterclaims in International
Investment Arbitration: at the Crossroads of Domestic and International Law, 24 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 157, 158 (2021).
41 Id. at 158; see, e.g., Renco v. Peru (I), ICSID Case No. UNCT/13/1, Claimant’s
Memorial on Liability (Feb. 20, 2014); Chevron v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No.
2009-23, First Partial Award on Track I (Sept. 17, 2013).
42 Ishikawa, supra note 2, at 34-35; Shao, supra note 40, at 158, 167.
43 Shao, supra note 40, at 173-74.
44 Id. at 174; see David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991).
45 Shao, supra note 40, at 173-74; see Vera Korzun, Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss:
How International Investment Law Changes Corporate Law and Governance, 40 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 189, 208-21 (2018).
46 Shao, supra note 40, 173-74. For these “outliers” in recent IIAs, see infra Section IV.B.
47 Jean-Michel Marcoux & Andrea Bjorklund, Foreign Investors’ Responsibilities and
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establish investor responsibilities typically are permissive; oftentimes, they
adopt broad, open-textured language, are crafted in non-binding terms, and
are directed to states (as opposed to investors).48
To be clear, the asymmetric structure of an IIA was originally designed
to address the perceived power imbalance between a foreign investor and a
host state once substantial costs have been expended to establish an
investment (the “hold-up” issue), and thus is at least to some extent
justified.49 However, given the significant impacts of investment treaty
arbitration on public interests and the actual imbalance of power in the
investor-state relationship,50 this traditional rationale is increasingly under
attack.51 As such, a normative gap is created between the lack of effective
mechanisms to hold foreign investors accountable for their wrongful conduct
in investment treaty arbitration and the extensive substantive protections
afforded to them under an IIA.52
This has increasingly fueled the critique that the IIAs are “unbalanced”
by design, undermining the rule-of-law attributes and legitimacy of
international investment law.53 And the argument goes that the asymmetries
of investment treaty arbitration system manifest a “structural bias” in favor
of multinational corporations’ commercial interests at the costs of the human
rights of the host state.54 Moreover, that a foreign investor is entitled to bring
direct claims of international arbitration under an IIA without investor
obligations may not only impede regulatory efforts to address investor
misconduct in terms of human rights, but further disincentivize investors
from adopting measures to ensure that their enterprises and business practice
are socially responsible.55
Such a gap could barely be filled by international human rights law as
Contributory Fault in Investment Arbitration, 69 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 877, 894 (2020).
48 Kabir A.N. Duggal & Nicholas J. Diamond, Human Rights and Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Reform: Fitting a Square Peg into a Round Hole?, 12 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT
291, 302-03 (2021) (noting that “[c]urrently, investors do not have direct obligations regarding
human rights on the international plane”; arguing that “the lack of substantive, binding
obligations in IIAs directed to investors” makes it unlikely for such investor obligations to
“support the realization of second- and third-generation human rights” or to generate
substantial effect in “counterbalancing the asymmetric structure of (the investment treaty
arbitration system)”).
49 Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth about InvestorState Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 712-13; see Howse, supra note 30, at 68.
50 See supra notes 22-48 and accompanying text.
51 Shao, supra note 40, at 157-58, 178; Choudhury, supra note 5, at 5-6.
52 Ishikawa, supra note 2, at 33.
53 Id. at 33-34; Patrick Dumberry & Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, When and How Allegations
of Human Rights Violations Can Be Raised in Investor-State Arbitration, 13 J. WORLD INV.
TRADE 349 (2012).
54 Shao, supra note 40, at 157-58.
55 Id. at 158, 174.
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it currently stands. Being vertical in nature, international human rights law
primarily imposes legal obligations on states to fulfill, respect, and protect
human rights, but generally lacks direct, enforceable legal effects upon
individuals, corporations, and private entities as a matter of international
law.56 Moreover, as of now, the international instruments seeking to establish
standards of conduct for business enterprises operating abroad have yet to
deliver formal, binding treaties, but are of an informal, “soft law” nature.57
Despite the efforts spent, the current initiatives to make a legally binding and
enforceable international instrument on multinational corporations and
business enterprises in terms of human rights lack political support from key
developed countries—most notably, the United States, the EU, Japan—as
well as the international business community.58 Though these instruments
reflect social expectations on corporate responsibility to respect human
rights, the soft law nature of them raises important questions on their capacity
to “create an actual sense of obligation for business enterprises,” particularly
their applicability in investment treaty arbitration.59
B. The Underlying Reasons for the Normative Conflicts
To begin with, it bears noting that the notion of “conflict” used here
refers to a contingent conflict in the application of international legal
obligations in concreto, rather than an intrinsic conflict between two sets of
international norms (i.e., one set of international norms is mutually exclusive
or inherently incompatible with another ipso facto).60 Indeed, there are no
automatic conflicts or inherent incompatibility between human rights norms
and IIA provisions.61 Yet, through the process of norm application and
implementation, real conflicts might arise a posteriori between a host state’s
obligations to safeguard and advance human rights and its obligations to
protect foreign investors.62 For instance, while paying compensations to a
Eric De Brabandere, Human Rights Considerations in International Investment
Arbitration, in THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 189-90 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Panos
Merkouris eds., 2012) (noting that strictly speaking, human rights have “no direct horizontal
effect . . . as a matter of international law, in relations between individuals and/or
corporations”). A rare exception is a set of peremptory norms of general international law (jus
cogens). Duggal & Diamond, supra note 48, at 298 (noting that “[o]n the international plane,
States are responsible for their own human rights violations, as well as abuses by businesses
that occur within their territory”).
57 Marcoux & Bjorklund, supra note 47, at 894-96.
58 Ishikawa, supra note 2, at 34.
59 Marcoux & Bjorklund, supra note 47, at 896; see VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 95-96 (2007).
60 VALENTIN JEUTNER, IRRESOLVABLE NORM CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
CONCEPT OF A LEGAL DILEMMA 31-32 (2017) (distinguishing between norms that intrinsically
conflict (“intrinsic conflicts”) and norms that only conflict when specific factual
circumstances arise (“contingent conflicts”)). BRABANDERE, supra note 5, at 136-37.
61 Yannick Radi, The ‘Human Nature’ of International Investment Law, 10 TRANSNAT’L
DISP. MGMT. 1, 3-4 (2010); BRABANDERE, supra note 5, at 136-37.
62 See Radi, supra note 61, at 4 (terming such a conflict a “conflict of interests” rather
56
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foreign investor may not be very difficult for a wealthy state with sufficient
resources at hand, when a state has fewer resources and the damages awarded
are particularly high, the government’s capacity to protect and promote
human rights may be significantly strained. Consequently, in a specific
situation, compliance with an IIA may make it difficult or even impossible
for a state to fulfill certain positive social and economic rights (particularly,
the core minimum standards of the ICESCR) towards its citizens, and vice
versa.63
At a fundamental level, the normative tensions and potential conflicts
between IIAs and human rights stem from the lack of coordination and
reconciliation between different branches of international law. Under a
traditional Westphalian model of international law, it is a state (rather than a
private entity) that bears formal, binding international legal obligations to
protect foreign investors under IIAs and to comply with human rights
obligations.64 Primarily focused on states as the violators, international
human rights law in principle does not directly bind foreign investors.65
Rather, it is a state that is legally obliged to ensure protection for human
rights within its jurisdiction, including protection from the misconduct of
foreign investors and the fulfillment of positive social and economic rights.66
Thus, a state, when assuming multiple roles simultaneously, might
occasionally find itself caught between conflicting obligations in a concrete
investor-state dispute, potentially creating a conflict of interest scenario.
To be sure, this problem is nothing new: in international law, it has long
been the case that “any complete coordination between systems of
international law” is absent.67 So are international investment law and human
rights law, as two different, yet intersecting, branches of international law.
Nonetheless, the normative conflicts between IIAs and human rights norms
have been substantially amplified and exacerbated by four notable
than a “conflict of norms”).
63 Under the ICESCR, the fulfillment of the core minimum standards requires the state to
use all of its resources and make best efforts to progressively achieve those norms. See
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 993 U.N.T.S.
3, art. 2(1) [hereinafter ICESCR] (the ICESCR now has more than 170 member states); see
also BEN SAUL, DAVID KINLEY & JACQUELINE MOWBRAY, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS 146-50
(2014).
64 Brabandere, supra note 56, at 188-91; Ari MacKinnon, Why Haven’t We Seen More
International Human Rights Law Issues in International Investment Arbitration?, in 40 UNDER
40 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 323-36 (Carlos González-Bueno ed., 2018).
65 MacKinnon, supra note 64, at 323-36. A very limited exception is a set of jus cogens
norms.
66 BRABANDERE, supra note 5, at 136-37; Choudhury, supra note 5, at 84 (“[A]s part of
their obligation to protect, States have a duty to prevent corporations and other non-State
actors from violating human rights and for providing remedies when those preventative
measures fail.”).
67 Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L.
753, 761 (2002).
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developments.
The first is the emerging economic, social, and cultural rights that
increasingly impose positive obligations on states to respect, protect, and
fulfill human rights.68 Unlike traditional civil and political rights,
implementation of these norms (such as the rights to health, life, water, and
education) requires a state to take positive measures to progressively achieve
the full realization of them.69 This takes not only expenditures and material
resources, but also active initiatives and regulatory measures. The second is
the dramatic proliferation of investment arbitrations and the substantial
increase in monetary damages and arbitration costs.70 With the sharp growth
of investment arbitral jurisprudence, investor-state treaty arbitrations today
tend to involve increasingly expansive investor rights, challenge wider
regulatory measures, and implicate more diverse stakeholders and greater
public interests.71
Thirdly, the tensions between foreign investors’ private interests and a
host state’s regulatory autonomy became more prominent with the advent of
modern “welfare” states. Compared with the early nineteenth century laissezfaire society theory whereby the main function of a state was merely to
protect private property, a modern “welfare” state often serves increasingly
68 See, e.g., ICESCR, art. 2(1); SAUL, KINLEY & MOWBRAY, supra note 63, at 1; Simma,
supra note 11, at 579; Chinen, supra note 31, 705-06.
69 ICESCR, art. 2(1), supra note 63, at 5; SAUL, KINLEY & MOWBRAY, supra note 63, at
1.
70 Daniel Behn, Malcolm Langford & Laura Létourneau-Tremblay, Empirical
Perspectives on Investment Arbitration: What Do We Know? Does It Matter?, 21 J. WORLD &
INV. & TRADE 188 (2020) (based on an empirical study of all investment arbitration cases with
known amounts awarded (up to February 1, 2019), finding that in investment treaty arbitration,
the mean monetary compensation is USD 482.5 million and the median compensation is USD
31 million (after adjusting values inflation to 2018); that in six cases, the investor is awarded
more than USD 1 billion; that the total of monetary compensations (excluding awards over
1billion) is more than USD 10 billion (up to 2017 and non-inflation-adjusted); and that the
average claimant costs are more than USD 6 million and average respondent costs are more
than USD 5 million). See DIANA ROSERT, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, THE STAKES ARE HIGH: A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION (2014), https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/stakes-are-highreview-financial-costs-investment-treaty-arbitration.pdf. See also Paparinskis, supra note 39,
at 1247 (“In investment law, in addition to ConoccoPhillips [(that ordered Venezuela to pay
damages of about USD 8.7 billion)] . . . investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms have
rendered USD one billion-plus awards in 2014 (against Russia), 2015 (against Ecuador), 2016
(against Venezuela), 2018 (against Egypt), and 2019 against Pakistan and (reportedly)
Russia.”).
71 GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC 89 (2006) (arguing
that the open-ended and vague treaty terms have endowed investment arbitrators with too
much discretion, and that investment arbitral jurisprudence has transformed “fair and equitable
treatment” into “an all-encompassing guarantee of highly flexible notions of fairness, equity,
and due process”); Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment?, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 30 (2003) (criticizing overly expansive interpretive approaches to “regulatory takings”
in investment arbitral awards made under the investment chapter of the North American Free
Trade Agreement).
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broad regulatory purposes, “interfering daily in all imaginable realms of
private activities by all imaginable measures and procedures.”72 Such an
expanded regulatory role by a state in modern economies has engendered
increasing tensions between private property interests and pervasive
sovereign regulatory powers.73
The fourth is the rising wave of “privatization” of public services in the
process of economic globalization. Through concession agreements and lease
contracts, foreign investors have been increasingly embedded in the public
sectors of host states, such as energy, mining, water, sewage, waste
management, and other public utilities.74 Conflicts might arise between a
state’s obligations regarding its citizens’ economic and social rights and its
IIA obligations towards foreign investors in concreto.75 In particular, during
an economic crisis, given that a host government typically feels compelled to
deploy regulatory interventions to address the emergency, adversely affected
foreign investors may file for investment treaty claims to seek compensation
for the losses incurred.76
Indeed, such normative conflicts could have been ameliorated by the
realization of IIAs’ policy goals to attract foreign investments, prosper the
economy, and create a virtuous welfare-improving circle in the host state.
This is what many capital-importing states that concluded IIAs in droves in
the 1990s had hoped for,77 as well as what many advocates of IIAs would
contend.78 However, this claim is not well grounded in empirical evidence.
While some studies found a modest link between the conclusion of IIAs and
some types of foreign direct investment inflows, others found no meaningful
correlation or only a marginal link between them, or suggested that it was
unclear whether IIAs’ impacts on foreign direct investments constituted a
benefit from the host state’s perspective.79
72 John H. Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 243, 251-52 (1941);
Ying Zhu, Do Clarified Indirect Expropriation Clauses in International Investment Treaties
Preserve Environmental Regulatory Space?, 60 HARV. INT’L L. J. 377, 385-86 (2019).
73 See Zhu, supra note 72, at 386; Barry Appleton, Regulatory Takings: The International
Law Perspective, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 35, 46 (2002).
74 Brabandere, supra note 56, at 183-84.
75 BRABANDERE, supra note 5, at 136-37.
76 Bellak & Leibrecht, supra note 27, at 152-53.
77 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 77-78 (2005).
78 See, e.g., Brower & Blanchard, supra note 49, at 755; Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan RoseAckerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: The Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 6 REV. INT’L ORGS. 1, 25-26, 30-31 (2011).
79 Roberts, supra note 16, at 90. See Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment
Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA.
J. INT’L L. 397 (2010); see also JONATHAN BONNITCHA, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: OVERVIEW
OF THE EVIDENCE 15 (2017), https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/assessingimpacts-investment-treaties.pdf.
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Substantially adding to the controversies is an overly liberal approach
to investor protection and state liability adopted by some tribunals. As noted,
most investment treaty disputes arose under older-generation IIAs, which
typically are short, vague, and full of gaps, without explicitly addressing the
policy space of states regarding human rights, public health, and
environmental protection.80 Notably, this interpretive approach tends to fill
gaps and resolve interpretive ambiguities in an IIA in favor of investor
protection by default, thereby subordinating legitimate regulatory goals to
investor protection.81 In the extreme, this interpretive presumption may treat
investor protection in almost absolutist terms akin to “a rights-based trump
card,” and hence can systemically advance an expansive adjudicatory
approach to issues of jurisdiction, standards of review, and state liability.82
As such, investor protection risks becoming an end in itself (rather than a
means to broader goals of development ideals), capable of overriding
regulatory interventions at odds with it.83 This partly explains why few
investment tribunals have explicitly and genuinely engaged with
noneconomic issues in their analyses, and why too many of them tended to
disregard, discount, or sidestep these complex issues, though recognizing
their relevance in general.84 In this way, this approach may significantly
aggravate the tensions between a host state’s obligations to protect foreign
See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text in Part I.
VAN HARTEN, supra note 71, at 137-38; see, e.g., Société Générale S.A. v. Philippines,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 (Jan.
29, 2004) (articulating this presumption: “The object and purpose of the BIT supports an
effective interpretation of Article X(2). The BIT is a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal
protection of investments. According to the preamble it is intended ‘to create and maintain
favorable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of
the other.’ It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favor the
protection of covered investments.”).
82 VAN HARTEN, supra note 71, at 137, 139; Broude & Henckels, supra note 9, at 95-100
(noting the prevalent predisposition of arbitrators, counsel, and scholars to treat investor
claims as rights claims in general and property claims in particular, “even if the normative
basis for this formulation is undertheorized, imperfect and imprecise”).
83 VAN HARTEN, supra note 71, at 139 (“But behind the investor rights approach is a
normative construction of investor protection as something so vital, so dominant, as to be
treated an end in itself, or at least as something that benefits states and their people more or
less as a rule without the need for any detailed inquiry into the implications of particular
interpretations for governments.”) For a different view, see Anthea Roberts, State-to-State
Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared
Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 12-13 (2014); see also Choudhury, supra note
10, at 1, 3-4 (arguing that investment protection is just a means to economic prosperity,
economic development, and sustainable development, rather than an end in itself).
84 Choudhury, supra note 10, at 1, 15-16 (arguing that the reason is because tribunals have
misconstrued the purpose of IIAs as investment protection, rather than development ideals).
For another account focusing on institutional reasons, see Hirsch, supra note 8, at 331-39
(listing the factors of the inter partes model, ad hoc tribunals with limited jurisdiction,
transparency and public participation, law-making authority of states and tribunals, global rifts
and bilateral solutions, asymmetries, and conceptual divide).
80
81
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investments and to honor the human rights of its local population,
intensifying the legitimate crisis that already plagued international
investment law.85
C. Searching for a Normative Bridge
Absent explicit treaty language, balancing competing investor rights
and human rights is largely at the realm of treaty interpretation and
application by investment tribunals, which typically enjoy considerable
discretion in their decision-making.86 From the perspective of applicable law,
this rebalancing could be achieved by applying international human rights
law to integrate considerations of human rights into tribunals’ decisionmaking. As will be detailed in Part III, there is significant room for tribunals
to leverage this international law-based judicial approach to reconcile and
alleviate the potential conflicts between investor protection and human
rights, without overly relaxing the standards of investment protection.
To be clear, this article does not advance a normative claim that
investment tribunals could or should serve as human rights courts in one way
or another. Neither does it suggest that investor-state arbitrators may engage
in some sort of adjudicatory “activism,” or could ex officio address the
relationship between investment protection and human rights without the
disputing parties’ submissions to that effect. In a consensual arbitration
process grounded on the parties’ consent to arbitrate investment disputes,
these positions inevitably risk departing from arbitrators’ limited mandate
under the IIAs, thereby opening the doors to challenge the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards or to annulment proceedings.87 Rather, this
article focuses on a specific scenario where a respondent state raises human
rights arguments (whether as defenses or claims) in investment arbitration
premised on IIAs that remain silent on this matter.88 It argues for a modest
judicial approach that investment tribunals should, in such circumstances,
take international law seriously, effectively address these arguments, and
remain sensitive to the human rights interests implicated, as opposed to
shunning away from or giving short shrift to them. Through the application
85 For a critique on the tendency of investor-state tribunals expansively interpreting
investor rights far beyond what was originally intended under IIAs, see Van Harten et al.,
supra note 21; see also THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P. Savant
and Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
86 Elrifai, supra note 6, at 836.
87 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art.
V, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW, art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, U.N. Sales No.
E.08.V.4 (2008), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media- documents/uncitral/
en/19-09955_e_ebook.pdf; Convention on the Settlement of International Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, art. 52, 14 Oct. 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter ICSID
Convention].
88 To be clear, this article does not address human rights arguments invoked by claimant
investors or third parties (amici curiae).
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of public international law (which includes international human rights law),
international adjudicators may find a normative bridge to reconcile
competing interests and order the relationship between international
investment law and human rights.
Before proceeding to the question of applicable law, it is worth asking
whether, and to what extent, investor-state tribunals have jurisdiction to
consider human rights arguments in investment arbitration. As a matter of
law, jurisdiction is distinct from the applicable law governing the substance
of a dispute.89
In investment treaty arbitration, the breadth of a tribunal’s jurisdiction
depends on the formulation of the investor-state arbitration provision (i.e.,
the jurisdictional clause) in an IIA, or the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID
Convention), whereby the states have granted their consent to arbitration.90
Depending on the specific language, the scope of these provisions varies. In
the case of a broad jurisdictional clause, treaty parties may consent to
arbitrate “any legal dispute concerning an investment” or “all disputes
concerning investment” between an investor and the host state.91 Likewise,
article 25 of the ICSID Convention extends the jurisdiction of the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to
“any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment.”92 A typical narrow
jurisdictional clause often exclusively covers disputes concerning an
investor’s claims of violations of IIA obligations by a host state.93 In the
extreme, the jurisdictional clause could be designed as narrowly as covering
only one or a few of the substantive investment protective standards provided
under an IIA.94
89 Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Fifty- Eighth
Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, ¶ 45 (2006), https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/
english/a_cn4_l682.pdf [hereinafter ILC Report on Fragmentation].
90 Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 5, at 83; Filip Balcerzak, Jurisdiction of Tribunals in
Investor–State Arbitration and the Issue of Human Rights, 29(1) ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV.
L.J. 216, 221-22 (2014).
91 See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the
Government of the Argentine Republic on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Fr.-Arg., art. 8, Jul. 3, 1991, 1728 U.N.T.S. 278; Agreement between the Polish
People’s Republic and the Republic of Austria on the Support and Protection of Investments,
Pol.-Austria, art. 8, Nov. 24, 1988, 1549 U.N.T.S. 61; Balcerzak, supra note 90, at 221.
92 ICSID Convention, art. 25(1).
93 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 11, art. 1116,
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]; Energy Charter Treaty, art. 26(1)-(2),
Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter ECT]; Balcerzak, supra note 90, at 221.
94 For example, such a jurisdictional clause may merely cover a dispute involving
expropriation or “the amount of compensation for expropriation.” See Agreement Between the
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Mongolian
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Under a delegated and limited mandate to resolve investment disputes,
investor-state tribunals in principle lack the competence to serve as general
human rights adjudicators. Thus, if an investor raised an independent claim
for breach of its human rights, such a claim should generally fall outside a
tribunal’s jurisdiction, unless the relevant jurisdictional clause provides
otherwise.95 Nevertheless, even in case of a narrow jurisdictional clause, a
tribunal’s jurisdiction is broad enough to cover invocation of human rights
obligations by the host state to challenge the jurisdiction or admissibility of
the underlying investment claims, to justify its alleged breaches of the treaty,
or to mitigate its legal liability.96 As such, tribunals possess the jurisdiction
to consider human rights arguments to the extent that they are connected with
or incidental to an informed decision of an investment claim.97 Therefore,
despite the confined jurisdiction of investment tribunals, human rights may
come to the forefront of investor-state treaty arbitration at the jurisdictional,
merits (liability), and quantum phases.
Moreover, in case of a broad jurisdictional clause, an investment
tribunal may have competence to accept a human rights-grounded
counterclaim raised by the host state. In this regard, a notable example is the
Urbaser v. Argentina decision, whereby an ICSID tribunal found within its
competence Argentina’s counterclaim premised on the investors’ alleged
breach of human rights obligations external to the IIA.98 As reasoned by that
tribunal, such a jurisdictional basis is due to that the IIA’s jurisdictional
clause was broad enough to cover a counterclaim and that both the principal
claim and the counterclaim arose directly out of an investment. 99 This
People’s Republic Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Mong., art. 8(3), Aug. 25, 1991. Balcerzak, supra note 90, at 221.
95 See, e.g., Biloune v. Ghana Investments Centre, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability,
95 I.L.R. 184, 183, 188, 203 (1989).
96 Balcerzak, supra note 90, at 227.
97 Id.; Santacroce, supra note 11, at 140; Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 5, at 84; Tamar
Meshel, Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration: The Human Right to Water and Beyond,
6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 277, 280 (2015).
98 See, e.g., Urbaser v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ABR/07/26, Award, ¶¶ 1143-55 (Dec.
8, 2016). See also Aven et al. v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award, ¶ 740 (Sept.
18, 2018) (the tribunal found that the jurisdictional clause referring to “an investment dispute”
was “in principle wide enough to encompass counterclaims,” and not exclusively reserved for
investors’ claims).
99 Urbaser, ¶¶ 1143, 1151 (According to the tribunal, “[i]t results clearly from these
provisions that either the investor or the host State can be a party submitting a dispute in
connection with an investment to arbitration. Arbitral decisions invoked by Claimants when
arguing that counterclaims are generally dismissed in actual practice are all based either on
more narrowly drafted arbitration clauses or on a lack of close connection of counterclaims
based on domestic law… (in this case) … Both the principal claim and the (counterclaim) are
based on the same investment, or the alleged lack of sufficient investment, in relation to the
same Concession.”); see Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments between the Kingdom of Spain and the Argentine Republic, Spn.-Arg., art. X(1)(3), Oct. 3, 1991 [hereinafter Spain-Argentina BIT]; ICSID Convention, arts. 25(1), 46.
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decision echoed Inmaris v. Ukraine, where the tribunal upheld its jurisdiction
over a counterclaim, on the ground that the IIA’s jurisdictional clause was
broadly worded to cover disputes “with regard to investments between” the
investor and the host state.100 This reading is consistent with the ordinary
meaning of the treaty language (such as “disputes with regards to/arising out
of/relating to an investment,” or other equivalents), as well as the object and
purpose of a typical IIA (i.e., to promote the economic development of the
treaty parties).101
In addition, a more flexible approach holds that the ICSID Convention
alone can endow a tribunal with jurisdiction to hear counterclaims, regardless
of the exact formulation of an IIA’s jurisdictional clause. Under this view,
where a host state provides its consent to ICSID arbitration via an IIA, the
consent to arbitrate any “counterclaims arising directly out of the subjectmatter of the dispute”—as stipulated under article 46 of the ICSID
Convention—should be automatically imported to the investment treaty
arbitration arising under the IIA.102 This means that even for a narrow
jurisdictional clause of an IIA, the treaty parties’ consent to arbitrate their
disputes under the ICSID Convention would provide an independent
jurisdictional basis for a tribunal to adjudicate counterclaims that arise
directly out of the same dispute.103 Far from being merely theoretical, this
approach was relied on and applied by the Goetz v. Burundi II tribunal to
uphold the jurisdiction over a counterclaim.104
While rare in practice, these investor-state decisions (from Urbaser v.
Argentina to Goetz v. Burundi II) evince the jurisdictional basis for a host
state to mount a counterclaim to enforce external human rights obligations
on an investor.

Inmaris v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, Award, ¶¶ 431-32 (Mar. 1, 2012).
Shao, supra note 40, at 166-67. For a minority view, see Marco Gavazzi and Stefano
Gavazzi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/25, Decision on Jurisdiction, Admissibility and
Liability (Apr. 21, 2015) (the tribunal declined jurisdiction over a counterclaim raised by
Romania, based on a narrow interpretation of a broadly crafted jurisdictional clause); see also
Agreement between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Government of Romania
on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, It.-Rom., art. 9(1), Dec. 6, 1990.
102 Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID ARB/06/01, Partial Dissent of Michael Reisman (Dec. 7,
2011). ICSID Convention, art. 46 (“Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall,
if requested by a party, determine any incidental or additional claims or counterclaims arising
directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute provided that they are within the scope of the
consent of the parties and are otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Centre.”). This view,
however, was not adopted by the tribunal majority in Roussalis v. Romania. See Roussalis v.
Romania, ICSID ARB/06/01, Award, ¶¶ 868, 872 (Dec. 7, 2011).
103 Brower & Blanchard, supra note 49, at 714-15.
104 Antoine Goetz et al. v. Burundi (II), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2, Award, ¶¶ 278-79
(Jun. 21, 2012) (relying on Reisman’s dissenting opinion in Roussalis v. Romania, the tribunal
held that despite the lack of an IIA’s explicit provision on counterclaims, the host state granted
its consent to counterclaims when consenting to the ICSID Convention in the IIA, which the
investor had accepted by invoking the states’ consent to arbitration at ICSID).
100
101
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III. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
AS THE LEX CAUSAE
This Part discusses the scenario whereby human rights law itself
becomes the applicable law governing the merits of investment treaty
disputes. Section A lays out the legal basis to import international human
rights law as the applicable law governing the substance of an investor-state
treaty dispute (the lex causae). It then proceeds to address direct application
of human rights law, including its invocations to ground an affirmative
defense (Section B) and to establish a counterclaim (Section C). Section D
examines indirect application of human rights law as an interpretive tool for
tribunals to inform their interpretations of an IIA’s substantive provisions.
A. Importing Human Rights Norms as the Applicable Law
In investment treaty arbitration, the substantive law governing the
merits of a dispute (lex causae) in principle is determined by the choice-oflaw provisions of the underlying IIAs (or arbitral institutional rules); or,
failing that, by arbitral tribunals.
In many IIAs—whether bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral—there are
choice-of-law provisions stipulating that international law shall govern the
resolution of investor-state disputes that arise under the treaty—either
exclusively or in conjunction with other laws.105 Further, as provided by the
ICSID Convention (under whose auspice the majority of investment
arbitrations are conducted), a tribunal shall apply “such rules of international
law as may be applicable” (among others), absent the parties’ selection of the
choice of law.106 As determined by these choice-of-law provisions, the
applicable law governing the substance of investor-state treaty disputes
includes public international law.
In the absence of such a choice-of-law provision at work, an investment
tribunal then must determine the applicable law governing the merits of the
disputes. In this regard, the weight of arbitral jurisprudence and
commentaries likewise suggests that international law should apply to the
substance of investor-state treaty disputes.107
In nature, investor-state treaty arbitration is not only created by
See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 30(1) [hereinafter 2012
U.S. Model BIT]; NAFTA, ch. 11, art. 1131(1); ECT, art 26(6).
106 ICSID Convention, art. 42(1).
107 Vivendi Universal v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment,
¶ 121 (Jul. 3, 2002); Phoenix v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶¶ 7778, (Apr. 15, 2009); MTD v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 204 (May 25, 2004)
[hereinafter MTD (Award)]. MTD v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Decision on
Annulment, ¶¶ 61, 72 (Feb. 16, 2007) [hereinafter MTD (Annulment)]; Yas Banifatemi, The
Law Applicable in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 208, 210 (Katia Yannaca Small ed.,
2010); HEGE ELISABETH KJOS, APPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 235
(2013); BRABANDERE, supra note 5, at 125-26; Christoph Hölken, Conflicts Between
International Investment Law and Domestic Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ITS OTHERS 213, 216 (Rainer Hofmann and Christian J. Tams eds., 2012).
105
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international treaties, but also is primarily concerned with the invocation of
IIAs to establish state responsibility for alleged breaches of these treaties.108
Importantly, it is international law that shall govern the interpretation and
application of an IIA and determine the establishment of state
responsibility.109 Though a treaty may opt out of certain rules of public
international law (other than peremptory norms of jus cogens), neither an IIA
nor investor-state treaty arbitration could opt out of all of the rules of general
international law, since they are created by and operate within the normative
framework of public international law.110 As a result, to the extent that an
investor grounds its claims on sources of international law, general
international law—composed of customary international law and general
principles of law—should serve as the default rules governing the merits of
investment treaty disputes, unless the treaty parties otherwise agreed.111
As part of the broader corpus of international law, international human
rights law may be imported as the applicable law governing the substance of
investor-state treaty disputes (lex causae), to the extent that it is relevant to
address the concrete legal issue in a particular case.112 This could occur
through two ways.
First, as noted above, even absent a choice-of-law provision, relevant
rules of general international law could govern the merits of an investment
treaty dispute, to the extent that the underlying IIA does not contract out their
application. It follows that international human rights law embedded within
the corpus of general international law (either as part of customary
international law or general principles of law) may become applicable to
investment treaty arbitration (scenario 1).
The second scenario is where the IIA contains a choice-of-law provision
referring to “applicable rules of international law.”113 As is customary for
international dispute resolution, the term “international law” should be
Banifatemi, supra note 107, at 208, 210; see KJOS, supra note 107, at 235.
Banifatemi, supra note 107, at 208, 210; see KJOS, supra note 107, at 235;
BRABANDERE, supra note 5, at 1-2, 125-26.
110 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can
We Go?, 95(3) AM. J. INT’L L. 535, 536-37 (2001) (making a similar point regarding the
relationship between WTO law and public international law: “Each new state, as well as each
new treaty, is automatically born into general international law. The treaty must exclude the
rules of general international law that the parties do not want to apply with respect to the treaty,
not the reverse”).
111 KJOS, supra note 107, at 235; see Raymond Yang Gao, The Role of Public International
Law in Integrating Human Rights Considerations in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 16 ASIA
J. WTO & HEALTH L. & POL’Y 275, 284-88 (2020) (arguing that “[i]n investment treaty
arbitration, the normative relationship between an IIA and public international law likewise
determines the applicability of public international law to govern the interpretation and
application of an IIA”); see also id.
112 Santacroce, supra note 11, at 141-42; Bree Farrugia, The Human Right to Water:
Defences to Investment Treaty Violations, 31 ARB. INT’L 261, 263-64 (2015).
113 See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, art. 30(1); Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement, Can.Peru, ch. 8, art. 837, May 29, 2008; NAFTA, ch. 11, art. 1131.
108
109
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construed under article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.114 Thus, in addition to general international law, a human rights treaty
between the host state and home state (i.e., treaty parties) may also constitute
the applicable law (scenario 2).
That said, three major conditions should be satisfied in order to qualify
external international human rights law as the lex causae. First, the
international human rights norms to be imported shall be directly binding on
the treaty parties.115 This means that in scenario 1, the human rights norms
must have been crystalized into “general principles of law” or “customary
international law.” In scenario 2, a human rights treaty needs to bind both the
treaty parties.116 Further, to be imported as the lex causae, the human rights
norms, at a minimum, must not be excluded by the treaty parties in the IIA’s
choice-of-law provision.117
Second, the imported human rights norms shall be “relevant” to the
legal issue arising in a particular dispute. Thus, external human rights norms
apply only to the extent that they are pertinent to the specific claims or
defenses raised in a concrete dispute, based on “their self-determined scope
of application.”118
Third, there needs to be a “norm” or a “rule” in actuality.119 While
seemingly self-explanatory, this condition may impose an important hurdle.
As stated, to the extent that it creates formal, binding legal obligations (as
“hard law” norms), international human rights law is, in principle, addressed
to states, rather than private entities. 120 In addition, current international
norms of corporate responsibility predominantly exist in a “soft law” form
with a non-binding nature.121 Therefore, most of human rights law may lack
direct “bite” on an investor in investment treaty arbitration.
Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 5, at 85; see Statute of the International Court of Justice,
art. 38(1) (“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations…”) (emphasis added).
115 Santacroce, supra note 11, at 142.
116 This notwithstanding, where only the host state (but not the home state of the investor)
is bound by a human rights treaty, it is still possible for an investment tribunal to take into
account such an instrument as a supplementary means to inform their interpretation of IIA
provisions. See infra Section III.D.
117 Santacroce, supra note 11, at 142; see Urbaser, ¶ 1202 (the tribunal found that art X(5)
of the Spain-Argentina BIT or the ICSID Convention underlying IIA did not contain “any
exclusion in respect of international law”).
118 Urbaser, ¶ 1202.
119 Simma, supra note 11, at 585 (making a similar point when explaining the elements for
applying article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
120 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text in Section II.A.
121 Farouk El-Hosseny & Patrick Devine, Contributory Fault under International Law: A
Gateway for Human Rights in ISDS?, 35 ICSID REV. 105, 114-16 (2020); Marcoux &
Bjorklund, supra note 47, at 894-96.
114
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The applicability of international human rights law was explicitly
confirmed by the tribunal in Urbaser v. Argentina, whereby the choice-oflaw provision of the IIA referred to (i) “another treaty” between the treaty
parties and (ii) “a general principle of international law.”122 When reviewing
the merits of the counterclaim raised by Argentina, the tribunal found that an
international human rights law obligation—provided as part of (i), or
representing (ii)—may become the applicable law governing the merits of
the dispute.123
Yet, it is worth noting a caveat here. That an investment tribunal can
have recourse to human rights law does not necessarily mean that it must
apply a specific human rights rule as part of the applicable law. If the tribunal
does not consider a human rights norm as directly bearing on the core issues
of the dispute, it may decide not to apply it.124 In other words, tribunals have
discretion to determine whether to import human rights to a given dispute,
and which specific human rights norms, rules, or instruments should be
applied as part of the lex causae.
B. Human Rights Arguments as Defenses Against State Responsibility
Given the applicability of human rights law as the lex causae, the
question then arises as to how a host state could invoke its human rights
obligations as a defense against state responsibility. Such a defense may be
mounted throughout the jurisdictional, merits, and quantum phases. The
remainder of this section analyzes its three major forms:
jurisdiction/admissibility defense, compensation defense, and conflict of
norms defense.
(A) Jurisdiction/Admissibility Defense
1. Legality Requirement
Foreign investors may engage in unlawful conduct in the host state. To
a varying degree, such conduct may adversely impact the human rights
interests of the host states, either directly or indirectly. A question arises as
to whether, and to what extent, such conduct should disqualify foreign
investors from invoking the protections of an IIA. Through arbitral practice,
investment tribunals have developed an important mechanism to that effect—
the legality requirement. On this basis, a tribunal may find that the investor’s
misconduct in breach of human rights should deprive the jurisdiction to hear
the investment claims or render those claims inadmissible.125
Urbaser, ¶ 1204. See Spain-Argentina BIT, art. X(5).
Urbaser, ¶ 1207.
124 Duggal & Diamond, supra note 48, at 302.
125 Commentators’ views on whether this is a matter of jurisdiction or admissibility differ greatly. See
Martin Jarrett, Sergio Puig & Steven Ratner, Investor Accountability: Indirect Actions, Direct Actions
by States, and Direct Actions by Individuals, ACADEMIC FORUM ON ISDS CONCEPT PAPER 2021/1, at 6
(June 2021), https://www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/projects/leginvest/academic-forum/papers/papers/
16_investor-accountability.pdf.
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Many IIAs require foreign investments to be made “in conformity with”
or “in accordance with” the law of the host state (the “legality
requirement”).126 Most typically, this legality requirement is provided in an
IIA’s definition of covered investments.127 Also, some other IIAs incorporate
this requirement into the substantive provisions on investment protection or
admission of investments.128 Investment tribunals generally construed such a
treaty provision as designed to preclude the IIA from protecting illegal
investments, granting access to investor-state treaty arbitration only to
investments made in accordance with the host state’s law.129 In this way, a
tribunal established under an IIA may deny jurisdiction to an investor’s
claims if the disputed investments were made in breach of this legality
requirement.
Yet, not all illegality in investor’s conduct per se would necessarily
deprive the jurisdiction of investment tribunals. Rather, to successfully
invoke the legality requirement, tribunals generally required the satisfaction
of three major conditions.130 The first concerns the timing of the investor’s
conduct. Through arbitral decisions, tribunals made it clear that the legality
requirement typically should only concern investor’s conduct when the
investment was made (i.e., at the establishment phase), and in most cases,
cannot extend to subsequent operation or performance of the investment.131
Rahim Moloo & Alex Khachaturian, The Compliance with the Law Requirement in
International Investment Law, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1473, 1476 (2011).
127 Jarrett, Puig & Ratner, supra note 125, at 4 (finding that as shown by UNCTAD’s treaty
mapping project, 1648 out of 2577 mapped IIAs contain such a requirement in the definition
of investments). See UNCTAD, Mapping of IIA Convent, https://investmentpolicy.
unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/iia-mapping.
128 Michael Polkinghorne & Sven-Michael Volkmer, The Legality Requirement in
Investment Arbitration, 34 J. INT’L ARB. 149, 149 (2017); see, e.g., Agreement between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines for the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Phil., art. 2(1), Apr. 18, 1991 (Promotion and
Acceptance: Each Contracting State shall “admit such investments in accordance with its
Constitution, laws and regulations.”).
129 Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, ¶ 115 (Jul. 14, 2010) (noting
that “the Contracting Party cannot be deemed to have given its consent to arbitrate the dispute
under . . . the BIT,” if the investment was not “established in conformity with” the host state’s
laws and regulations as required by the definition of “investment” under the IIA); Saluka v.
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 204 (Mar. 17, 2006); Moloo & Khachaturian,
supra note 126, at 1478.
130 For a critique on these limitations of the legality requirement, see Jarrod Hepburn, In
Accordance with Which Host State Laws? Restoring the “Defense” of Investor Illegality in
Investment Arbitration, 5 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 531 (2014).
131 Jarrett, Puig & Ratner, supra note 125, at 4. See, e.g., Quiborax v. Bolivia, ICSID Case
No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 266 (Sept. 27, 2012). The tribunal based its decision
to limit application of the legality requirement provision to the establishment phase on the
wording of the Bolivia-Chile BIT, since the “[t]reaty refer[red] to the legality requirement in
the past tense by using the words investments ‘made’ in accordance with the laws and
regulations of the host State”; see also Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Uzbekistan, ICSID Case
126

27

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:1 (2021)

The second one relates to the nature and extent of investor’s illegal
conduct, even at the establishment phase. Investment tribunals have been less
consistent with respect to this condition. Some tribunals required a finding of
serious or grave illegality by the investors, apparently adopting a “minor
errors” test.132 Other tribunals held that the legality requirement cannot be
invoked against investors’ “good faith” mistakes.133 Finally, there are
tribunals adopting a tripartite approach to examine the proportionality
condition. This was evinced in Kim v. Uzbekistan, where the tribunal
articulated three elements to assess. These include: (i) “the significance of
the obligation with which the investor is alleged to not comply”; (ii) “the
seriousness of the investor’s conduct”; and (iii) whether the investor’s
conduct in breach of the law would undermine a host state’s significant
interest, such that a proportionate response is to preclude the investment
outside the IIA’s protection.134
The third condition concerns estoppel by the host state. Some tribunals
found that the host state should be estopped from raising the investment’s
illegality, if it knew of that illegality yet still endorsed the investment.135
Importantly, even where the IIA contains no such an explicit provision
on the legality requirement, some investment tribunals found an implicit
legality obligation under the IIA, holding that the treaty cannot grant
substantive protection to investments made in breach of the domestic law
and/or international law.136 A notable example is Plama v. Bulgaria, where
No ARB/10/3, ¶ 193 (Oct. 4, 2013). For a minority approach, see infra note 375.
132 Moloo & Khachaturian, supra note 126, at 1494-95; see, e.g., Tokios Tokelés v.
Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 83 (Apr. 29, 2004) (finding
that precluding treaty’s protection based on “minor errors”—such as defects in documents
filed by the investor with the host state government with respect to the investment—would
contravene the object and purpose of the IIA).
133 Fraport v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. AR1/03/25, Award, ¶ 396 (Aug. 16, 2007)
(adopting a “good faith” test: indicators of “a good faith error” might be “the failure of a
competent local counsel’s legal due diligence report to flag that issue,” or “the offending
arrangement was not central to the profitability of the investment, such that the investor might
have made the investment in ways that accorded with local law without any loss of projected
profitability”). Desert Line v. Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, ¶¶ 116, 117 (Feb.
6, 2008) (referencing Fraport’s good faith test, and holding that the investor’s failure to obtain
a particular certificate from the respondent state needs not preclude the investment from
invoking the BIT. Instead, the tribunal reasoned that the question should be “is the likelihood
that the investor would have received a certificate if he had believed it was necessary and
requested it?”).
134 Vladislav Kim et al. v. Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 406-08 (Mar. 8, 2017).
135 Moloo & Khachaturian, supra note 126, at 1497-99 (noting that likewise, a host state’s
affirmative statement ratifying the investment (e.g., recognition that the contracts at issue are
valid) may lead the tribunal to find against a violation of domestic law in the first place); see
Fraport, ¶ 346; Desert Line, ¶ 119; Inmaris v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, Decision
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 140 (Mar. 8, 2010).
136 Moloo & Khachaturian, supra note 126 at, 1482-83 (arguing that absent an explicit
legal requirement provision in an IIA, precluding the treaty’s protection to an investor is a
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the investment claims invoked the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) containing
no express legality requirement provision. In that case, the tribunal held that
“the substantive protections of the ECT cannot apply to investments that are
made contrary to law,” since the treaty should be interpreted in ways
consistent with its fundamental goal of “strengthen[ing] the rule of law on
energy issues.”137 With respect to the legality at issue, the tribunal found that
the investment was made through fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentations in serious violation of Bulgarian law and international law
(most notably, the good faith principle).138
Likewise, in Hamster v. Ghana, the tribunal held that an IIA shall not
provide protection to investments created through corruption or fraudulent
conduct, in breach of national or international principles of good faith, or the
host state’s domestic law.139 Though the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)
contains a legality requirement provision, the tribunal clarified that such an
implicit legal requirement was required by general principles of law,
independent of an IIA’s specific language to this effect.140
Other investment tribunals have also found in favor of such an implicit
legality requirement that an IIA would not protect investments made or
obtained in breach of national law or international principle of good faith,
and recognized that it existed as a general principle of law even in the absence
of an express treaty provision.141
2. Declining Investors’ Claims for Their Violations of Human Rights
Thus far, investment tribunals have mostly invoked the implicit legality
requirement to deny IIAs’ protection to investments that were illegally
obtained through corruption, bribery, as well as fraudulent and deceptive
matter of admissibility at the merits stage, rather than that of jurisdiction).
137 Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 139 (Aug. 27, 2008).
138 Id. ¶¶ 143, 144 (noting that the good faith principle was a part of Bulgarian law and
international law, and holding that providing ECT’s protection here would run contrary to the
principle of nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans and a basic notion of international
public policy—that “a contract obtained by wrongful means (fraudulent misrepresentation)
should not be enforced by a tribunal”).
139 Hamester v. Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, ¶ 123 (Jun. 18, 2010).
140 Id. ¶ 124. Yet, in that case, the tribunal eventually found that the respondent state had
failed to fulfill its burden of proof with respect to the investor’s alleged fraudulent act when
making the investment. Id.
141 Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA,
¶¶ 1351-52, n. 1773 (Jul. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Yukos v. Russia]; SAUR v. Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/04/4, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 308 (Jun. 6, 2012) (translated:
“[the tribunal] is aware that the finality of the investment arbitration system is to protect only
lawful and bona fide investments. Whether or not the BIT between France and Argentina
mentions the requirement that the investor act in conformity with domestic legislation does
not constitute a relevant factor. The condition of not committing a serious violation of the legal
order is a tacit condition, inherent to any BIT as, in any event, it is incomprehensible that a State
offer the benefit of protection through arbitration if the investor, in order to obtain such
protection, has acted contrary to the law.”).

29

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:1 (2021)

conduct.142 Outside of these specific scenarios, tribunals have yet to address
investors’ violations of human rights. Though untested in practice, extending
this approach to violations of human rights in a more general sense is not
only a logical move from the perspective of the applicable law, but also a
desirable development from the policy perspective.
In Plama v. Bulgaria and Hamester v. Ghana, the tribunals, aside from
confirming an implicit obligation to comply with the law of the host state,
also assessed the investors’ conduct under international law as a precondition
for invoking an IIA.143 This approach is logical, in that international law
serves as the substantive law governing an investor-state treaty dispute,
regardless of the existence of an explicit choice-of-law provision.
Yet, rather than requiring an investor’s compliance with international
law as a general matter, these tribunals focused on the fundamental
international legal principle of good faith.144 Even so, it may be argued that
“any knowing violation of international legal obligation” could equally
violate the principle of good faith.145 Indeed, the decline of treaty protection
for illegality under international law should be applied equally, and “there is
no good reason to prioritize one violation of the law over another.”146 Thus,
just like investments obtained through corruption, bribery, as well as
fraudulent and deceptive conduct, investments made illegally in serious
violation of applicable substantive international law obligations—including
international human rights norms and environmental norms—could likewise
be deprived of an IIA’s protection.147 In this way, tribunals could decline the
treaty’s protection to investments established in serious violation of human
rights, even without a treaty provision incorporating the legality requirement.
As to the nature and extent of illegality, the Kim v. Uzbekistan tribunal’s
tripartite approach to proportionality seems to provide a more transparent,
coherent, and principled approach. Notably, this approach enables tribunals
to balance the need to grant investment protection and the necessity of
disciplining illegal investments through a proportionality test.148 To
understand how this test will be applied in concreto, it is worth noting the
tribunal’s practice in Cortec v. Kenya, which arose under the U.K.-Kenya

142 See, e.g., World Duty Free v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 179 (Oct.
4, 2006); Plama, ¶¶ 139, 143, 144.
143 See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
144 Moloo & Khachaturian, supra note 126, at 1487.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.; Choudhury, supra note 5, at 16.
148 Jarrett, Puig & Ratner, supra note 125, at 8 (cautioning the risk: “A broadly worded
provision that made any violation of national law grounds for denial of access to arbitration
could allow the state to circumvent key IIA protections (obligations)”). The same could be
said of tribunals’ interpretation and application of the implicit legality requirement, as an
overly broad approach risks defeating the object and purpose of an IIA.
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BIT containing no explicit legality requirement.149
In that case, the tribunal found in favor of an implicit legality obligation
requiring the investor to comply with Kenya’s domestic law. As held by the
tribunal, this is because “[t]he text and purpose of the BIT and the ICSID
Convention are not consistent with holding host governments financially
responsible for investments created in defiance of their laws fundamental
protecting public interests such as the environment.”150 As required by
Kenyan law, the investor was obliged to conduct an environmental impact
assessment, which it failed to fulfill.151 When assessing whether this illegality
should preclude the investor from invoking the BIT, the tribunal followed the
Kim v. Uzbekistan tribunal’s tripartite test. First, it found that those regulatory
obligations “were of fundamental importance in an environmentally
vulnerable area.”152 Second, the tribunal considered that the investor’s
conduct “showed serious disrespect for the fundamental public policies of the
host country in relation to the environment and resource development.”153
Third, it concluded that the investor’s failure to obtain the environmental
license was “of considerable weight” and constituted “‘significant’ prejudice
to the host state,” such that denying the protection of the BIT and ICSID
Convention could be a proportionate response under international law.154
Investment tribunals may follow the approach of Kim v. Uzbekistan and
Cortec v. Kenya to hold investors accountable for their unlawful conduct with
respect to human rights in the host state. When an investor failed to comply
with international human rights law (or alternatively, the host state’s
domestic law incorporating such norms), tribunals may dismiss the
investment claims, provided that such obligations are important to the host
state, the investor’s conduct is serious or grave, and the resultant prejudice to
the host state’s interest is so important that it is proportionate to deny an IIA’s
protection.155
The above discussion deals with the invocation of human rights law in
general, which remains largely untested in investment treaty arbitration,
despite the legal basis and policy rationale supporting this approach. It bears
noting that if certain human rights can be considered as part of international
peremptory norms of jus cogens, the applicability of such norms to ground a
jurisdiction/admissibility defense would be relatively clear-cut, as arbitrators
and commentators tend to share a consensus on that.156 For example, the
tribunal in Phoenix v. Czech stated that ICSID protection should not “be
See Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Kenya, U.K.-Kenya, Sept. 13, 1999.
150 Cortec v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/29, Award, ¶ 333 (Oct. 22, 2018).
151 Id. ¶ 365.
152 Id. ¶ 346.
153 Id. ¶ 349.
154 Id. ¶¶ 362, 365.
155 Choudhury, supra note 5, at 16.
156 UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 15.
149
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granted to investments made in violation of the most fundamental rules of
protection of human rights, like investments made in pursuance of torture or
genocide or in support of slavery or trafficking of human organs.”157 Thus, at
a minimum, when an investor egregiously breached these peremptory norms
in relation to the investment in dispute, an investment tribunal may decline
the investor’s IIA claims.158
(B) Compensation Defense
1. Doctrine of Contributory Fault in International Law
At the merits or quantum phase, even in the face of a treaty breach, the
host state may raise a defense against the monetary damages awarded to the
investor. By invoking the doctrine of contributory fault, the host state could
argue that the investor’s illegal or wrongful conduct with respect to human
rights should lead the tribunal to apportion liabilities between the disputing
parties, and accordingly deduct the compensation awarded to reflect the
investor’s own contributory fault in causing its own injury.
Rooted in the law of state responsibility (as part of generational
international law), the doctrine of contributory fault requires international
adjudicators to consider victims’ own fault giving rise to or exacerbating their
injury suffered, enabling a corresponding reduction of damages.159
Historically, this doctrine first emerged as “a corollary of the full reparation
principle”: reparation must “wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act
and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if
that act had not been committed” as far as possible.160 By implication, the
compensation due should only address the injuries caused by the breaching
party, and shall not exceed the loss actually suffered by the victim.161 In this
regard, as provided by article 39 of the International Law Commission (ILC)
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
(generally considered as a codification of customary international law):
In the determination of reparation, account shall be taken of the
contribution to the injury by wilful or negligent action or omission
of the injured State or any person or entity in relation to whom

ICSID Convention, at ¶ 78.
Hirsch, supra note 8, at 326 (noting that alternatively, arbitrators may assert jurisdiction
yet declare that IIA provisions protecting the investment are inapplicable or void for
conflicting with jus cogens in a particular dispute).
159 El-Hosseny & Devine, supra note 121, 107; see International Law Commission (ILC),
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
Commentaries (2001), art. 39, Commentary, ¶ 1 [hereinafter ILC Articles on States’
Responsibility].
160 Permanent Court of International Justice, Chorzów Factory, 1928 PCIJ, Series A, No
17 (Merits); ILC Articles on States’ Responsibility, supra note 159, art. 31.
161 MARK KANTOR, VALUATION FOR ARBITRATION: COMPENSATION STANDARDS,
VALUATION METHODS AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 104 (2008).
157
158
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reparation is sought.162
Yet, not every form of behavior of the victim is relevant for this purpose.
Instead, only “willful” or “negligent” actions or omissions that “manifest a
lack of due care on the part of the victim for his or her own property or rights”
qualify for invoking contributory fault under article 39.163 Though undefined
by the ILC, the notion of “negligence” needs not be “serious” or “gross”—
rather, its relevance depends on “the degree to which it has contributed to the
damage as well as the other circumstances of the case.”164 As commented on
by Sergey Ripinsky and Kevin Williams, “negligence” could be assessed by
“a test of reasonableness,” requiring a context-specific inquiry to consider
various “factors that are capable of affecting the form or reducing the amount
of reparation in an appropriate case.”165
To be clear, investment tribunals enjoy wide discretion to take into
account claimants’ contributory fault, but may decide not to apply this
doctrine in a given case based on their appreciation of the factual situation.
To successfully claim a set-off, tribunals tend to require that the contribution
of investor wrongdoings in provoking the disputed measures should be
“material and significant,” with a “sufficient” causal link between that
misconduct and the prejudices suffered.166
In investment arbitral jurisprudence, there is a salient trend that
investment tribunals have increasingly relied on contributory fault (as
codified in article 39) to set off damages awarded to an investor to reflect the
latter’s own fault resulting in its own injury. In this regard, the factual
patterns generally fall into two scenarios: (i) though unrelated to the
wrongdoing of the host state, the misconduct of the investor had contributed
to its losses suffered, and (ii) the investor misbehavior had provoked the
disputed measure of the host state, thus contributing to the latter’s
wrongdoings.167
As for the first scenario, an exemplary case is MTD v. Chile, where the
tribunal found that the investors had contributed to their own injury through
their lack of due diligence and bad business judgment when making the
investment. In that case, the tribunal noted that the investors (two real estate
development firms) had accepted an exorbitant land valuation on the future
assumptions that the required development permits would be issued, without
seeking “adequate professional advice in the urban sector” or relevant
ILC Articles on States’ Responsibility, supra note 159, art. 39.
Id. ¶ 5.
164 Id.
165 SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
315 (2008); see ILC Articles on States’ Responsibility, supra note 159, art. 39, Commentary,
¶ 5.
166 See, e.g., Yukos v. Russia, ¶¶ 1600, 1599, 1615; Occidental v. Ecuador, ICSID Case
No ARB/06/11, Award, ¶ 687 (Oct. 5, 2012).
167 Yukos v. Russia, ¶¶ 1604, 1605.
162
163

33

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:1 (2021)

contractual protections.168 Emphasizing that “BITs are not an insurance
against business risk,”169 the tribunal found the investors’ bad business
judgment had “increased their risks in the transaction,” such that their own
fault had contributed to the injuries suffered, irrespective of the host state’s
breach of the fair and equitable (FET) treatment.170 On this basis, the tribunal
concluded that the investors should bear responsibility for their own
negligence as experienced businessmen, and accordingly reduced damages
by fifty percent.171
In the subsequent ICSID annulment proceeding, the annulment
committee confirmed such findings on contributory fault, holding that the
investors were faulty in failing to “safeguard [their] own interests rather than
a breach of any duty owed to the host [s]tate.”172
Regarding the second scenario, the following cases are the most relevant
ones. In Occidental v. Ecuador, the tribunal found the investors’ failure to
obtain a mandatory ministerial authorization before their transfer of certain
contractual rights had breached the Ecuadorian hydrocarbon law, and that
such “grave mistakes” and “negligence” had contributed to Ecuador’s breach
of the FET treatment (in cancelling the concession agreement).173 In the
exercise of its discretion, the tribunal reduced the damages by twenty-five
percent, as a result of the investors’ “material and significant” wrongdoings
contributing to that degree of the injury suffered.174
In Yukos v. Russia, the tribunal reduced the compensation awarded by
twenty-five percent for the investors’ contributory fault of tax avoidance
schemes.175 While finding the disputed Russian measures in breach of the
ECT, the tribunal noted that two instances of the investors’ tax avoidance
arrangements had materially and significantly contributed to their own
prejudices.176 Relying on articles 31 and 39 of the ILC Articles on States’
Responsibility, the tribunal found that the claimants must pay a price for their
“material and significant misconduct,” despite the fact that Russia’s
subsequent measures were disproportional and constituted expropriation.177
On this basis, the tribunal used its discretion to apportion fault between the
MTD (Award), ¶¶ 168, 178. In this way, the investors had substantially invested in a
land project that was already subject to an existing zoning regulation by the government.
169 Id. ¶ 178 (stressing that BITs do not insure against any business risks that the investor
assumed irrespective of the host state’s conduct).
170 Id. ¶ 242 (noting that “[a] wise investor would not have paid full price up-front for land
valued on the assumption of the realization of the Project; he would at least have staged future
payments to project progress, including the issuance of the required development permits”).
171 Id. ¶¶ 178, 243.
172 MTD (Annulment), ¶¶ 99, 101.
173 Occidental, ¶¶ 662, 680, 681.
174 Id. ¶ 687.
175 Yukos v. Russia, ¶¶ 1592, 1596-98, 1633, 1637.
176 Id. ¶¶ 1615, 1621, 1634.
177 Id. ¶¶ 1634, 1637.
168
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disputing parties, and reduced the damages due by twenty-five percent.178
Likewise, the Goetz v. Burundi II tribunal reduced the compensation
due to one of the expropriated assets by thirty percent for the investor’s
misconduct that triggered the measures of expropriation.179
2. Investors’ Wrongdoings with Respect to Human Rights
In addition to investors’ lack of due diligence and violations of domestic
law, contributory fault may equally apply to their wrongdoings with respect
to human rights of the local communities.
In Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, the tribunal, after finding the host state
violative of the Canada-Ecuador BIT for termination of the investor’s mining
concessions, proceeded to examine the investor’s wrongdoings with respect
to its own injury under the rubric of contributory fault.180 In that regard, the
tribunal emphasized the investor’s “sustained act of folly” in “recruiting and
using armed men, firing guns and spraying mace at civilians, not as an
accidental or isolated incident but as part of premeditated, disguised and wellfunded plans to take the law into its own hands” through its local agents.181
In the view of the tribunal, these acts “had substantially reduced [the
investor’s] chances of turning its . . . concessions into a commercial success,”
making the situation far worse for itself (such that the project was bound to
fail).182 On this basis, the tribunal assessed the investor’s faulty contribution
to its own injury to be thirty percent, and correspondingly deducted the
damages awarded.183
Specifically, in that case, the tribunal found several of the investor’s
local senior personnel (in the host state) “guilty of directing violent acts
committed on its behalf, in violation of Ecuadorian criminal law.”184
Stressing that “[t]heir subterfuge and mendacity aggravated those acts,” the
tribunal noted that the “adverse response from members of the local
communities, already hostile, was inevitable.”185 Further, the tribunal found
the investor’s senior management in Canada (i.e., the home state) negligent
with respect to the planning and execution of these acts, though no evidence
suggested they were fully privy to such misconduct.186 But the tribunal
reasoned that, had it based its decision of contributory fault on the
aforementioned Canadian management’s willful conduct, the consequences
Id. ¶¶ 1592, 1596-98, 1633, 1637.
Goetz, ¶ 299; Elrifai, supra note 6, at 867.
180 Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012-2, Award, ¶ 6.98 (Mar. 15, 2016) (“[T]he
issue is whether, and if so, to what extent, the Claimant’s worsening situation as the
concessionaire in the Junín area was caused (in whole or in part) by its own acts or
omissions.”).
181 Id. ¶ 6.99.
182 Id.
183 Id. ¶ 6.102.
184 Id. ¶ 6.100.
185 Id.
186 Id.
178
179

35

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:1 (2021)

under article 39 would have been be much graver.187
Another seminal decision in the human rights context is Bear Creek v.
Peru. In that case, the tribunal split over whether the investor had contributed
to the social unrest that provoked the host state’s measures in violation of the
IIA (i.e., a decree terminating the investor’s right to operate its mining
concessions). The majority of the tribunal did not support such a finding, but
instead downplayed the investor’s lack of sufficient relationship-building and
consultation with the affected local community.188 Finding that the investor
had comported with all legal requirements on this matter, the majority refused
to apply contributory fault to reduce damages.189
In contrast, dissenting arbitrator Philippe Sands found that the investor’s
failure to obtain a “social license” to operate in the local community had
contributed in a material and significant way to the local social unrest that
provoked Peru’s responsive measures.190 Though recognizing that the
International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 (addressing the
rights of indigenous and tribal peoples) imposed obligations only on states,
Sands considered that this instrument was not “without significance or legal
effects” for a private investor: under the Convention, an investor shall
effectively engage in consultation with all potentially affected local
communities to deal with their concerns over the investments, and obtain a
“social license” to operate.191 In the view of Sands, due to its own negligence,
the investor had failed to carry out its obligation under the Convention to
properly “give effect to the aspirations” of the local indigenous people, whose
rights were not lesser rights under international law.192 On this basis, Sands
concluded that the investor’s contributory fault with respect to its own injury
made it equally liable as the host state, and thus reduced the damages by
half.193
In a recent ICSID arbitration (Gabriel Resources Ltd. v. Romania)
concerning a USD 3.2 billion claim, the host state raised arguments building
on Copper Mesa v. Ecuador and Bear Creek v. Peru, contending that the
investor’s contributory fault in failing to obtain a social license to operate
should reduce its damages (if any).194 It awaits to be seen whether and how
Id.
Bear Creek v. Peru, ICSID Case No ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 664-67 (Nov. 30, 2017).
189 Id. ¶¶ 567, 668.
190 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No ARB/14/21, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Philippe
Sands, ¶ 4 (Nov. 30, 2017) (“The Respondent has clearly established the Claimant’s
contributory responsibility, by reason of its acts and omissions, to the social unrest that left
the Peruvian government in the predicament it faced, and the need to do something reasonable
and lawful to protect public well-being.”) [hereinafter Sands’ Dissenting Opinion].
191 Id. ¶¶ 10, 37.
192 Id. ¶¶ 11, 36.
193 Id. ¶¶ 1, 39.
194 Gabriel Resources Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/31, Claimants’ Reply
and Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 113, 147-78 (Nov. 2, 2018).
187
188
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this tribunal will address such arguments and enter into a judicial dialogue
with these precedents.
Nevertheless, not all tribunals are consistent in relying on contributory
fault.195 For instance, in South American Silver v. Bolivia, the tribunal
rejected the contributory fault argument raised by the host state.196 In that
case, Bolivia based this argument on the claimant’s alleged “violations of
human and indigenous rights, the social conflict and the infringement of other
laws of Bolivia.”197 The tribunal noted that it shall construe the IIA in
accordance with the ILO Convention 169 (ratified by Bolivia) in order to
“guarantee the protection of the Indigenous Communities”198 and that
Bolivia’s “sovereign decision to expropriate the Mining Concessions was the
result of a severe and prolonged social conflict that originated with the
[investment] Project.”199 However, the tribunal eventually found that the
treaty breach arose from Bolivia’s failure to compensate for expropriation
(rather than from the act of expropriation itself), and thus was not attributable
to the investor, despite recognizing that the investor had contributed to the
social unrest leading to the expropriation.200 While this view may be
criticized for taking too strict a view of causation (seemingly suggesting that
all unlawful expropriations might be unable to invoke contributory fault), it
reveals the inconsistency in tribunals’ application of this doctrine under
general international law. To address such uncertainties and inconsistency,
treaty parties could use carefully crafted IIA provisions to clarify the
conditions for invoking contributory fault.
Further, the decisions of Copper Mesa v. Ecuador and Bear Creek v.
Peru are not without controversies. In Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, the tribunal
concluded that the investor’s Canadian senior management was negligent,
though not willful, with respect to the hired local agents’ criminal activities,
without providing any benchmark to examine the conduct.201 Likewise, in
Bear Creek v. Peru, Sands’ approach is unconventional in holding the
investor accountable for its failure to carry out the recommendations and
guidelines of international “soft law,” which are generally deemed nonbinding.202 At a deeper level, these instances reflect a broader dilemma of
Marcoux & Bjorklund, supra note 47, at 892-94.
South American Silver v. Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2013-15, Award, ¶ 875
(Nov. 22, 2018).
197 Id. ¶¶ 788, 381 (The respondent claimed that the claimant’s local subsidiary “committed
several abuses that led to an unsustainable escalation of violence that endangered the life and
rights of the Local Communities and the public officials and forced the State, after having
supported the continuity of the Project, to decree Reversion as an ultima ratio.”).
198 Id. ¶ 199.
199 Id. ¶ 875.
200 Id.; see El-Hosseny & Devine, supra note 121, at 127.
201 Copper Mesa, ¶ 6.100.
202 El-Hosseny & Devine, supra note 121, at 123-26, 128. Though the right to consultation
(provided by the ILO Convention 169) had been incorporated into Peru’s domestic law (as
argued by Sands), both the Convention and the Peruvian law (Resolution 26253) only impose
195
196
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applying international human rights law. Namely, given that most binding
human rights norms are of a vertical nature and primarily regulate the conduct
of sovereign states (rather than private entities), it is difficult to directly
assess investors’ conduct by applying human rights law itself.203
In response, tribunals could follow the MTD v. Chile tribunal’s approach
to address investor misconduct, adopting a “due diligence” test to determine
whether an investor has properly safeguarded its own interests. Indeed,
investor wrongdoings under the rubric of contributory fault need not be
equated with illegality per se, but may also include “willful” or “negligent”
acts or omissions that fail to exercise due care with respect to its own rights
or interests.204 Determination of the latter could entail “a test of
reasonableness”
to
examine
what
a
reasonable
business
enterprise/businessman would do to take care of its own interests, in light of
all relevant factors capable of affecting compensation in a given case.205
These factors may include the investor’s level of sophistication and available
resources (a large, resourceful multinational firm or a small and medium
enterprise), the degree of deviation of investor’s conduct from widely
recognized international standards of responsible business practice
(including industry-specific soft law obligations regarding environmental
assessments, prior consultation with local communities, and a “social
license” to operate), the nature of the investments (environmentally friendly
or exploitive), the potential adverse effects of the investments to the local
communities and the environment, and the situation of the local communities
(such as to what degree vulnerable indigenous and tribal peoples are
affected), among others.
Under this approach, Sands’ decision to give effect to the investor’s
failure to comply with a soft law norm to obtain a “social license” could be
better justified on a doctrinal basis: as a sophisticated multinational mining
company, the investor ought to take appropriate steps to safeguard its own
interests in a specific case. However, while aware of the soft law obligation
to engage in prior consultation and obtain a social license, Bear Creek still
failed to effectively fulfill this requirement, resulting in the social unrest that
provoked the government’s revocation of its mining rights.206 Given these
context-specific circumstances, the investor’s wrongdoing (though not
illegality per se) may constitute its “negligence” that materially and
significantly contributes to its own injury. Likewise, under the same test,
such obligations on the state, rather than private investors or business enterprises.
203 Brabandere, supra note 56, at 189-90; see Marcoux & Bjorklund, supra note 47, at 895.
An exception is a set of peremptory norms (jus cogens), which also bind individuals, firms,
and private entities.
204 ILC Articles on States’ Responsibility, supra note 159, art. 39, Commentary, ¶ 5.
El-Hosseny & Devine, supra note 121, at 128-29. Gao, supra note 111, at 309.
205 RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 165, at 315. See ILC Articles on States’
Responsibility, supra note 159, art. 39, Commentary, ¶ 5. Gao, supra note 111, at 309.
206 Sands’ Dissenting Opinion, ¶¶ 12, 38, 39.
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Copper Mesa’s Canadian senior management could be found negligent in
failing to exercise an appropriate level of due diligence over its major
business operation abroad, evincing its fault with respect to the human rights
violations in Ecuador.
Further, under this approach, the degree of investor’s fault also matters
for invoking contributory fault, such that there are different consequences for
negligence, serious or gross negligence, or willfulness (the greater the fault,
the bigger the ratio of damages reduced).207 Likewise, in the presence of both
a lack of due diligence and illegality (such as violations of international hard
law, domestic law, or investment contract) on the part of the investor,
tribunals may further increase the level of fault for which an investor should
be responsible.208
In short, MTD v. Chile, Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, and Bear Creek v.
Peru demonstrate the potentials of applying contributory fault to discipline
investor wrongdoings in investment arbitration, thus holding them
accountable for their misconduct with respect to human rights in the host
state. Whether through the test of illegality or “due diligence,” the doctrine
of contributory fault provides an important mechanism to give effect to
international human rights norms (soft law or not) in this process. This could
not only contribute to a more balanced system of investment treaty
arbitration, but may incentivize and pressure foreign investors to comply with
human rights requirements, even those non-binding standards, in the first
place.
(C) Conflict of Norms Defense
Thirdly, human rights law may be invoked at the merits phase to
preclude a finding of state responsibility. A distinction needs to be drawn
here. Indeed, human rights may be invoked with respect to a specific element
of an investment protection standard or an affirmative defense under general
international law. For instance, when defending against an expropriation
claim, the host state may argue that its measure was adopted to safeguard
human rights as a legitimate public purpose, in efforts to invoke the police
powers doctrine. In this way, the host state, however, still needs to address
other elements necessary for invoking the police powers doctrine, including
due process, non-discriminatory and good-faith application, and
proportionality.209 In addition to this scenario, human rights could also be
207 See Copper Mesa, ¶ 6.100 (In obiter dicta, the tribunal reasoned that if its decision on
contributory fault was based on investor’s willful conduct (rather than negligence), the legal
consequences under article 39 would become much graver.).
208 See Occidental v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Brigitte Stern’s Dissenting
Opinion, ¶¶ 7-8 (Sept. 20, 2012) (arguing that rather than reducing the damages by 25 percent,
“[a] split 50/50 would have been even more justified, as the Claimants have acted both very
imprudently and illegally”) (emphasis added). See also Gao, supra note 111, at 309.
209 Catharine Titi, Police Powers Doctrine and International Investment Law, in GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 14-15 (Filippo Fontanelli
et al eds., 2018), https://papers.sTitsrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3050417.
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invoked as an independent defense against a breach of an IIA, precluding a
state’s responsibility in its own right.
This sub-section focuses on the latter scenario in the form of a “conflict
of norms” defense. Namely, the host state may contend that its investment
protection obligations under an IIA should be superseded by an applicable
international human rights obligation in conflict with the former. As a matter
of law, this conflict of norms argument is different from the treaty
interpretation argument that tribunals should read an IIA in harmony with
human rights norms (in Section III.D).210
To resolve a conflict of norms as such, the first step is to establish
whether two norms actually contradict with each other. Under the prevailing
view in international law, a “conflict” is narrowly defined as “direct
incompatibility” between two norms, arising “only where a party to the two
treaties cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under both
treaties.”211 While IIAs and human rights law may impose conflictual
obligations simultaneously in concreto, a finding of conflict of norms may
not be a straightforward case, since international law adopts a general
presumption of coherence against a conflict between different rules.212 Given
the lack of legal hierarchy between existing and new rules of international
law (other than jus cogens), a new treaty is generally assumed to generate
effects that are consistent with existing rules of international law, at least
absent clear evidence to the contrary.213 In most cases, potential conflicts may
be “interpreted away” by interpreting an IIA in harmony with other human
rights obligations.214 A genuine legal conflict should be rare, as it only arises
when a harmonious interpretation is not feasible.215
Thus, to raise a conflict of norms defense, firstly, a host state bears the
burden of proving the existence of a “conflict”: namely, adherence to an IIA
will inevitably lead to a breach of its international human rights obligations
in the specific factual circumstances, which cannot be harmonized by treaty
interpretation. Then, a tribunal should apply traditional conflict resolution
rules under international law, including lex superior, lex specialis, and lex
posterior, in order to determine which norm should prevail.216 In addition,
ascertaining the intention of the treaty parties could also play a role as a

See infra Section III.D.
C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 401,
426 (1953). Erich Vranes, The Definition of “Norm Conflict” in International Law and Legal
Theory, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 395, 395 (2006).
212 Pauwelyn, supra note 110, at 550-51.
213 Id. at 550; Simma, supra note 11, at 583; Hersh Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation
and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 67
(1949).
214 See infra Section III.D; see also Pauwelyn, supra note 110, at 550-51.
215 See infra Section III.D; see also Pauwelyn, supra note 110, at 550-51.
216 Santacroce, supra note 11, at 151-53.
210
211
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conflict resolution rule.217 However, as noted earlier, most IIAs simply did
not deal with human rights issues,218 making it difficult to determine states’
intentions on this matter.
In practice, Argentina has raised this line of conflict of norms
arguments, among others, in relation to its people’s human right to water in
several investment arbitrations challenging its emergency measures adopted
to address a national economic crisis around 2000.219 Such conflict of norms
arguments in essence contended that since the economic crisis undermined
the basic human rights of its citizens, an IIA should not prevail over
emergency measures taken to remedy the effects of the crisis and to preserve
the basic human rights of its people.220 However, in most of these decisions,
the tribunals did not uphold such defenses, instead generally showing
reluctance to effectively engage with the human rights that were allegedly in
conflict with investors’ rights.221
In Azurix v. Argentina (a dispute arising from a concession to provide
water and sewerage services), Argentina argued that there was a conflict
between the BIT at issue and human rights treaties protecting consumers’
rights.222 One of Argentina’s experts maintained that “a conflict between a
BIT and human rights treaties must be resolved in favor of human rights
because the consumers’ public interest must prevail over the private interest
of service provider.”223 The tribunal avoided a finding of incompatibility of
the BIT with human rights treaties in concreto, noting that “(t)he matter has
not been fully argued” and that the services to consumers continued without
interruption.224 Likewise, in Siemens v. Argentina, Argentina argued that
given its social and economic conditions, upholding the claimant’s property
rights “would constitute a breach of international human rights law”
incorporated into its constitution.225 The tribunal considered that this
argument had not been properly developed by Argentina, and that “without
the benefit of further elaboration and substantiation by the parties, it is not an
argument that, prima facie, bears any relationship to the merits of the case.”226
217 Id. at 153; Moshe Hirsch, Interactions Between Investment and Non-Investment
Obligations in International Investment Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 160 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).
218 See supra notes 5-6, and accompanying text.
219 Argentina typically raised the conflict of norms defense in conjunction with a
“necessity” defense (by either invoking the “non-precluded measures” clauses under the BITs
or the customary necessity doctrine codified in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility). This
subsection focuses on the conflict of norms defense only.
220 BRABANDERE, supra note 5, at 143.
221 Id. Choudhury, supra note 10, at 18-19.
222 Azurix v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 254 (Jul. 14, 2006).
223 Id.
224 Id. ¶ 261.
225 Siemens v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶¶ 75, 79 (Jan. 17, 2007).
226 Id. ¶ 79. See BRABANDERE, supra note 5, at 144 (noting that this is “a rather cryptic
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In Suez v. Argentina, the tribunal took note of Argentina’s defense that
its human rights obligations to assure its population the right to water should
trump its IIA obligations.227 However, the award rejected this argument,
finding that “Argentina is subject to both international obligations, i.e.,
human rights and (investment) treaty obligations, and must respect both of
them equally.”228 In the view of the tribunal, “Argentina could have respected
both types of obligations,” since under “the circumstances of these cases,
Argentina’s human rights obligations and its investment treaty obligations
are not inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive.”229
The Suez decision resonates with CMS v. Argentina, an earlier case
involving a private utility firm operating a gas transmission business. In that
case, Argentina argued that an IIA was not above its constitution and that “as
the economic and social crisis that affected the country compromised basic
human rights, no investment treaty could prevail as it would be in violation
of such constitutionally recognized rights.”230 The tribunal found no such
collision, reasoning that “the [c]onstitution carefully protects the right to
property, just as the treaties on human rights do” and “there is no question of
affecting fundamental human rights when considering the issues disputed by
the parties.”231
In retrospect, these unsuccessful invocations of the conflict of norms
defense suggest three important hurdles preventing these arguments from
prevailing. The first is the reluctance of the host state itself to fully articulate
such a human rights defense. While these arbitral decisions have been widely
criticized as being insensitive to the underlying human rights obligations, it
is common that Argentina’s human rights arguments only emerged briefly
and obliquely, and were couched in general and vague terms, but a wellelaborated defense based on Argentina’s specific human rights obligations
were not made.232 Moreover, while the Suez and CMS tribunals’ decisions
may be critiqued for their hasty conclusions of no conflict without giving due
consideration to the human rights implicated, it is unclear how Argentina has
satisfied the burden of establishing a genuine “conflict” of norms in the
specific factual circumstances from the outset. In an arbitration process
heavily reliant on the arguments raised by the disputing parties, this means
that investment tribunals are less likely to take human rights considerations
seriously, but may regard them as empty references or just a pretext in an
statement that seems to imply that the Tribunal considered that it had no jurisdiction over the
question”).
227 Suez v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶ 262 (Jul. 30,
2010).
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 CMS v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 114 (May 12, 2005).
231 Id. ¶ 121.
232 ALVAREZ, supra note 20, at 455-56.
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attempt to disguise breaches of IIAs.233
While Argentina’s attitude as such seems counter-intuitive for a litigant
in a contentious proceeding, it bears noting that raising full-blown human
rights arguments may result in political consequences that are undesirable
from the eyes of the government. To do so could not only confirm certain
positive human rights obligations which presently manifest a degree of
nebulosity that a state is more comfortable with, but also embolden domestic
human rights activists contrary to the government’s intention.234 Indeed,
human rights arguments are normally raised by private parties against a state;
yet having a state mount a human rights defense in investment treaty
arbitration would reverse the conventional role of human rights.235 Such
sensitive political considerations may explain the half-hearted ways in which
Argentina had pleaded the human rights defense, generating a practical
hurdle hindering a conflict of norms argument from playing a more important
role.
Second, the unsettled existence and normative content of certain human
rights norms will impose a doctrinal hurdle. Recall that though investment
tribunals have recourse to apply human rights as part of the applicable law,
whether to import human rights to a particular dispute and which specific
norms to apply are largely at their discretion.236 As emerging norms that have
yet to become crystalized into general principles of international law or get
codified into widely accepted treaties, many second- and third- generation
human rights norms, such as the rights to water or an adequate living
standard, are nebulous in scope, ambiguous in normative substance, and
evolve over time.237 It should come as no surprise that, generally, the more
unsettled the existence, scope, and content of a human rights norm, the more
difficult it is for investor-state arbitrators (many of whom do not have human
rights expertise or background) to grasp the exact contours of its substance,
let alone to apply it to overrule relatively clear-cut investment protection
standards. This partly explains investment tribunals’ tendency to downplay,
sidestep, and discount such human rights-arguments in their analyses.
For instance, the right to water was a cutting-edge notion in international
human rights law, at least at the time of those Argentina arbitrations. Albeit
233 Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Investment Treaty Arbitration 29 (Apr. 2003) (Working Paper
prepared for the Swiss Ministry for Foreign Affairs), https://www.iisd.org/system/files/
publications/investment_int_human_rights_bits.pdf.
234 Simma & Kill, supra note 2, at 680 n.11.
235 Christoph Schreuer, Book Review: E. De Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as
Public International Law, 62 NETH. INTL L. REV. 167, 170 (2015).
236 See supra note 124 and accompanying text in Section III.A.; see also Duggal &
Diamond, supra note 48, at 302 (arguing that “[t]his uncertainty directly impacts the degree
to which second- and third- generation human rights can play a role in the resolution of the
dispute”).
237 Fry, supra note 3, at 80.
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gaining momentum across the international community over time, it has yet
to become a standalone human right in international treaties—at best, it is
characterized as an “emerging” independent right that imposes specific
obligations on states.238 Though it may inform arbitrators’ treaty
interpretation, “the reading of the obligations . . . developed by the Covenant
Committee” in General Comment 15 of the ICESCR concerning the right to
water is not “legally binding per se” on states’ parties.239 As such, the
uncertainties surrounding this norm would make it difficult for an investorstate tribunal to directly apply it to a concrete dispute, not to mention in ways
as Argentina had suggested (i.e., to function akin to a blanket exception that
would effectively annul IIAs’ obligations and eviscerate any investment
claims).
Third, traditional conflict resolution norms under international law may
be unable to provide a clear answer as to which norm should prevail. To begin
with, other than jus cogens norms, international law contains no rules that
establish a normative hierarchy between different treaties or rules.240 Thus,
except for a rare scenario where an IIA collides with peremptory norms, the
principle of lex superior will be of little avail for resolving a conflict between
an IIA obligation and a human rights norm.
In contrast, the principles of lex posterior and lex specialis would be
more helpful, but only to a limited extent. First, these principles apply when
two conflicting obligations cover the same subject matter, but an IIA
provision and a human rights norm may not relate to the same subject
matter.241 While the subject matter of an IIA provision may be the treatment
of certain foreign investor that a host state should guarantee in a given
situation, a human rights norm may concern the rights of individuals (such
as citizens, local community, and indigenous people) that a government
should protect and promote as its subject matter. As such, it is unclear
whether an IIA provision and a human rights norm cover the same subject
matter, though application of one of them might somehow implicate another.
Even under a broad construction of the “subject matter,” many
difficulties and uncertainties persist when applying these two principles to
resolve a conflict. The lex posterior principle, codified in article 30 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (entitled “Application of
successive treaties relating to the same subject matter”), generally requires
that in case of a conflict, a later treaty between the same parties should prevail
over an earlier one (lex posterior derogat anteriori).242 But this principle
cannot address the situation where the parties to the treaties are not
Meshel, supra note 97, at 277.
Simma, supra note 11 at 590-91.
240 Brabandere, supra note 56, at 194; Santacroce, supra note 11, at 151.
241 Brabandere, supra note 56, at 195-96; Santacroce, supra note 11, at 152.
242 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
238
239
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identical.243 In that case, application of lex posterior would be contrary to the
inter partes effects of international treaties.244 Even assuming that the conflict
of norms was between the same treaty parties, “in many cases it may be
difficult to ascertain which norm is more recent in time.”245 Given that a state
is obliged to progressively “respect, protect, and provide” social, economic
and cultural rights and should implement them step-by-step in light of many
context-specific variables, it is often difficult (if not infeasible) to pinpoint a
precise moment when these human rights obligations become effective.246
Likewise, the lex specialis principle (i.e., more specific norms prevail
over generic norms) is unable to address every conflict between human rights
law and an IIA. Indeed, in many situations an IIA provision may be more
specific than a human rights norm. But this might not always be the case.247
Given that the degree of specificity of the norms in conflict should be
evaluated based on the circumstances of a given case, sometimes a human
rights norm may relate to a factual scenario more specifically (in obliging the
state to adopt a measure that an IIA only prohibits by implication or in generic
terms).248 In other times, it may be that the level of specificity of the
conflicting norms seems so similar that it is “impossible, or overly artificial
to consider one norm as more specific than the other.”249 In addition, a
difficult case may arise when using different metrics (e.g., “the substantive
coverage of a provision or … the number of legal subjects to whom [a norm]
is directed”) would lead to different conclusions as to which norm is
“particular” or “general.”250 Finally, the principle of lex specialis also has an
unclear relationship with the lex posterior principle, further adding to the
difficulties in their application.251
In short, due to these inherent uncertainties and ambiguities of the
conflict resolution norms under general international law, it is often difficult
for a tribunal to conclude with a straightforward answer as to which norm
should prevail. To be sure, the above is not to deny the validity of the conflict
of norms defense per se. Rather, the above analysis explains why this line of
arguments only played a rather peripheral role thus far and almost never
succeeded in investment treaty arbitration, revealing the major hurdles to
ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 89, ¶ 243; JAN KLABBERS, TREATY CONFLICT
(2009).
244 Brabandere, supra note 56, at 195.
245 Santacroce, supra note 11, at 152; see JORGE E VINUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
THE ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (2012).
246 Santacroce, supra note 11, at 152; see Asbjørn Eide, Adequate Standard of Living, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 3, at 198.
247 Brabandere, supra note 56, at 196.
248 Santacroce, supra note 11, at 152.
249 Id.
250 ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 89, ¶ 58.
251 Id.
243
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overcome for such a defense to prevail. At the end of the day, for this conflict
of norms argument to gain traction in investment arbitration, these three
factors need to be properly addressed.
That said, as human rights law evolves into more concrete shape with
clearer legal status in general international law over time, had a host state
determined to defend bona fide regulations furthering legitimate human
rights goals made such arguments more elaborately and forcefully, investorstate tribunals may need to engage in a sophisticated conflict of norms analysis
to determine whether, and to what extent, an extraneous human rights rule
could supersede an IIA provision. If upheld, this human rights defense may
serve to constrain, modify, or even preclude an investor’s rights under the
IIA in effect. In this way, it may be that “some investor-[s]tate claims will
become vehicles for potentially innovative decisions concerning how [s]tates
are supposed to comply with both their human rights and their (IIAs)
obligations.”252
Alternatively, if a host state government fails to take this argument
seriously for political concerns, other stakeholders adversely affected by the
investments, civil societies, and NGOs could step in and participate in
investment arbitration as third parties (amici curiae), in order to voice human
rights concerns and articulate the conflict of norms arguments. Further, to
address the ambiguities of human rights norms and conflict resolution norms,
treaty parties may come up with carefully crafted treaty provisions ex ante—
such as a supremacy clause—to clarify under what conditions which interest
could prevail over another. If well formulated, such provisions could help to
better safeguard a state’s regulatory autonomy to advance public interests and
remove uncertainties in resolving a conflict of norms.
C. Counterclaims Invoking Human Rights Obligations
The preceding Section discussed how human rights law may be invoked
defensively to import an extrinsic rule to counter a claim by an investor. This
Section proceeds to a parallel situation. Namely, where the IIA’s
jurisdictional clause allows, international human rights law could be invoked
offensively, establishing a counterclaim to enforce external obligations on
investors.
While Section II.C has already discussed the jurisdictional basis to
accept counterclaims, another issue facing an investor-state tribunal is a
matter of admissibility (i.e., whether it is appropriate for adjudicators to hear
the counterclaims), on which it enjoys a wide discretion.253 To be admissible,
it is generally required that a counterclaim should be sufficiently connected,
both legally and factually, to the primary claim.254 It is worth noting that the
ALVAREZ, supra note 20, at 456.
YUVAL SHANY, QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 47-53 (2016). Shao, supra note 40, at 168-69.
254 Anne K. Hoffmann, Counterclaims in Investment Arbitration, 28 ICSID REV. 438, 44553 (2013); Andrea Bjorklund, The Role of Counterclaims in Rebalancing Investment Law, 17
252
253
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legal connection and factual connection are not two “cumulative” elements—
rather, a tribunal should holistically examine the overall connection between
a counterclaim and a principal claim, taking into account both factors.255
In terms of the legal connection, counterclaims grounded on an identical
IIA are indeed strongly connected to an IIA claim by an investor.256 Even
when a counterclaim is grounded on a different legal basis (such as
international human rights law), it may be found admissible, where its factual
connection to the primary claim is sufficiently strong—for example, the
disputed measure was intended to respond to an investor’s alleged
misconduct.257 This is the case in Aven v. Costa Rica: the host state there
adopted several measures to address the investors’ alleged breach of its
environmental laws, and the tribunal found admissible the counterclaims
grounded on international environmental law and domestic environmental
law.258 However, where the counterclaims and primary claims arise out of
different factual situations or their factual bases are of a different nature, it is
difficult to establish a sufficient factual link between them.259
With the satisfaction of the jurisdictional and admissibility conditions,
the next issue is to identify a substantive legal basis to establish a
counterclaim. In the absence of IIA provisions stipulating investor
obligations, applicable general sources of international law, such as
international human rights law, could be relied on to fill the gap. In that
regard, a remarkable decision is Urbaser v. Argentine. In that case, the
investors, as shareholders of a concession responsible for the supply of water
and sewerage services, claimed that their water concession was unlawfully
terminated by Argentina.260 Argentina contended that the termination was
adopted to address the claimants’ alleged failure to comply with the
requirements under the concession agreement.261 In the investment treaty
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 461, 571-73 (2012); Pierre Lalive & Laura Halonen, On the
Availability of Counterclaims in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 2 CZECH Y.B. OF INT’L L. 141
(2011).
255 KJOS, supra note 107, at 150.
256 See Shao, supra note 40, at 169-70.
257 Shao, supra note 40, at 170. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, 274-75, ¶¶ 322-27 (Dec. 19, 2005)
(holding that a counterclaim based on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(VCDR) was admissible in relation to a primary claim grounded on the law of use of force,
since the former bore a strong factual connection with the latter (i.e., the alleged breach of the
VCDR was claimed to result from the use of force)).
258 Aven et al., ¶¶ 93-181, 698-715, 742-47 (the tribunal eventually refused to exercise
jurisdiction over the counterclaim on other procedural grounds—i.e., the host state had failed
to meet the requirements of articles 20 and 21 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules).
259 Shao, supra note 40, at 171-72. See, e.g., Oxus Gold v. Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL,
Award, ¶ 956 (Dec. 17, 2015) (finding a factual link wanting, since the primary claim related
to the ways the investment was established while the counterclaim concerned the
circumstances in which the investment was operated).
260 Urbaser, ¶ 34.
261 Id. ¶¶ 848-950.
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arbitration, Argentina mounted a counterclaim, alleging that the investors’
failure to provide the necessary level of investment in the water supply
services had breached the international human right to water of the local
communities.262 In other words, Argentina argued that the challenged
measure was taken to respond to the investors’ misconduct in terms of the
local population’s human right to water, suggesting a strong factual link
between the counterclaim and principal claim. In the view of the tribunal, not
only was the factual link manifest, but the legal connection was “also
established to the extent the [c]ounterclaim [wa]s not alleged as a matter
based on domestic law only.”263
Though the tribunal upheld the jurisdiction and admissibility to accept
the counterclaim, it eventually rejected it at the merits stage, on the ground
that it was a state (rather than an investor) that bore positive international
legal obligations to fulfill the right to water and to provide sanitation to its
citizens.264 According to the tribunal, the right to water and sanitation was an
international human right imposed on states, as opposed to investors: it was
the host state’s international legal obligation to fulfill the human right to
water of its citizens, while the investors were only obliged by the concession
contract—rather than international law—to supply water and sanitation
services.265 In other words, based on the host state’s domestic law (rather than
international law), the counterclaim was, in essence, a contractual claim in
the disguise of an international human rights law claim. On this basis, the
tribunal dismissed the counterclaim on the merits.266
That said, the tribunal admitted in obiter dicta that the negative
obligation not to violate the human right to water may directly bind private
parties and individuals.267 It noted that the “situation would be different in
case an obligation to abstain, like a prohibition to commit acts violating
human rights would be at stake[,]” which “can be of immediate application
. . . equally to individuals and other private parties.”268 Therefore, had the
investors violated the negative obligations of the right to water, they could
be held accountable via the counterclaim mounted.269
Despite the dismissal of Argentina’s counterclaim, this instance yields
two points to note. First, the failure of the counterclaim is not out of an
inherent conflict between an IIA and human rights norms ipso facto, but
Id. ¶ 1165.
Id. ¶ 1151.
264 Id. ¶ 1210.
265 Id.
266 Id. ¶ 1221.
267 Id. ¶ 1210.
268 Id.
269 STEFANIE SCHACHERER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: KEY CASES FROM THE 2010S 26 (Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Martin
Dietrich Brauch eds., 2018), https://www.iisd.org/library/international-investment-law-andsustainable-develop ment-key-cases-2010s.
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rather due to the vertical effects of international human rights law itself,
whose positive legal obligations are primarily imposed on states (rather than
corporations, individuals, and private entities). This limitation may largely
hinder international human rights-based counterclaims from prevailing.
Second, the decision sheds light on the untapped potential of invoking
newer IIA provisions that explicitly impose investor responsibilities in
relation to human rights, which could provide the necessary “bite” to hold
investors accountable. When the jurisdictional clauses allow, had a tribunal
found a claimant investor in breach of such obligations directly related to the
investment at issue, it may deduct the compensation awarded by the amount
of the counterclaim upheld, thereby disciplining investor wrongdoing in this
process. If this prevailed, an investor can be directly held accountable for its
misconduct with respect to the local population’s human rights.
Even if dismissed on the merits, the presence of counterclaims could
bring human rights issues to the forefront of tribunals’ deliberations,
potentially prompting them to give more interpretive weight to the public
interest implications when assessing investors’ claims.270 The following
section proceeds to explore the latter scenario.
D. International Human Rights Law as Interpretive Tools
As the lex causae, international human rights law not only could directly
apply to the substance of disputes without the filter of treaty interpretation,
but also may indirectly function as interpretive tools to guide tribunals’
interpretations of IIA’s obligations. When interpreting an IIA provision,
tribunals could take into account external international human rights norms
to inform their construction of an investment protective standard, with a view
to avoiding conflicts between an IIA and human rights. This can be achieved
by applying the principle of systemic integration—a canon of treaty
interpretation enshrined in article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.
(A) Application of the Principle of Systemic Integration
Reflecting a customary principle of treaty interpretation, article 31(3)(c)
of the VCLT allows consideration of “any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties” along with the context of a
treaty.271 Importantly, this principle could serve as a customary interpretive
tool for international adjudicators to bring in external interpretive materials
of human rights norms to guide their treaty interpretation.272 Its application
involves a two-step process. Step one assesses whether an extrinsic rule is
admissible for treaty interpretation; step two proceeds to determine the
interpretive weight to be accorded to that rule.273
Choudhury, supra note 10, at 21, 56.
VCLT, art. 31(3)(c).
272 Simma, supra note 11, at 584-86; See Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic
Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279, 285
(2005).
273 See Jürgen Kurtz, Building Legitimacy Through Interpretation in Investor-State
270
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As regards the first step, a strictly doctrinal approach requires that the
“rules of international law” to be taken into account shall be “relevant” (i.e.,
they shall bear on “the same facts as the treaty under interpretation”) and
“applicable” (namely, the rules shall remain in force between the treaty
parties).274 The “applicability” condition generally requires that the rules
should either constitute general principles of law/customary international
law, or be part of binding international treaties between the treaty parties.
Bruno Simma and Theodore Kill provided a more flexible and nondogmatic approach. According to them, the license of systemic integration is
malleable, enabling tribunals to take an evolutionary approach of treaty
interpretation to consider relevant rules that exist at the time of treaty
interpretation, not only when the IIA was concluded.275 Further, the relevant
rules to be taken into account could be broad enough (i.e., they need not
address the same subject matter as the IIA), and could include international
obligations that apply to only one of the parties, as well as erga omnes
obligations (which include most human rights norms).276 Under this
approach, these rules may even extend to the “soft law” norms that are not
legally binding on the treaty parties, including, for instance, the ICESCR
Covenant Committee’s comments clarifying the normative content of the
convention rights (such as the rights to water and health).277 In short, when
interpreting an IIA, the external rules to be taken into account need not be
limited to the human rights obligations that formally bind a host state, but
could cover more general (and even softer) human rights norms that are
generally deemed applicable among states. Likewise, other commentators
argued that as all UN members are bound by human rights obligations, IIAs
in general shall be presumed to be in harmony with the relevant human rights
obligations, requiring “human rights friendly interpretations” to international
investment law.278
In step two, adjudicators need to decide how much weight to give to the
extrinsic rules. Two interpretive presumptions may come into play.279 The
first is a positive presumption: for issues that a treaty does not “resolve in
express terms or in a different way,” general principles of law or customary
international law shall apply in default, serving an important “gap-filling”
Arbitration, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 280-81 (Zachary
Douglas et al. eds., 2014).
274 ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 89, ¶ 416; McLachlan, supra note 272, at
315.
275 Simma & Kill, supra note 2, at 683-86. See Simma, supra note 11, at 583.
276 Simma, supra note 11, at 586; Simma & Kill, supra note 2, at 678, 695.
277 Simma, supra note 11, at 591 (arguing that investment tribunals shall consider these
human rights norms when interpreting the “health” or “environment” exception clauses of
investment treaties).
278 Vivian Kube & E.U. Petersmann, Human Rights Law in International Investment
Arbitration, 11 ASIA J. WTO & HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 99 (2016).
279 ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 89, ¶ 465; McLachlan, supra note 272, at
311.
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function to “defragment” different sub-systems of international law.280
The second is a negative presumption: when undertaking treaty
obligations, contracting parties are presumed not to act inconsistently with
general international law and existing treaty obligations that are already
binding upon them.281 In other words, absent clear evidence to the contrary,
a treaty in dispute should be construed in harmony with other extrinsic
international obligations binding on the treaty parties. This presumption
resonates with a canon of treaty interpretation: a treaty shall not be presumed
to deviate from or conflict with fundamental principles of international law,
unless the parties use explicit language to that effect.282
Either way, an IIA provision should be construed in harmony with
relevant human rights law to the extent possible. In case of an alleged conflict
between a human rights norm and an open-textured IIA provision that
permits several interpretations, if a harmonious interpretation is possible
(within the realm of treaty interpretation and short of modifying the treaty
language), this interpretation should be preferred.283 Therefore, when there
are multiple reasonable interpretations of a treaty provision, adjudicators
should adopt the one that best avoids a conflict with other relevant external
norms.284 In short, to the extent that treaty interpretation allows “ample room
for maneuvering,” a tribunal should interpret a broadly-worded IIA provision
in light of applicable human rights law, with an eye to avoiding a normative
conflict.285
(B) Interpreting IIAs’ Substantive Guarantees in Harmony with
Relevant Human Rights Obligations
Through the process of systemic integration, investment tribunals may
interpret substantive investment protection standards in harmony with
relevant international human rights obligations, alleviating the normative
conflicts between them. Application of systemic integration would be
particularly relevant to guide tribunals’ interpretation of core IIA concepts
that are often broadly termed in ambiguous, open-textured language.286 Due
McLachlan, supra note 272, at 311.
Id.; see, e.g., Case Concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v.
India), Judgment (Preliminary Objections), 1957 I.C.J. 125, 142 (Nov. 26, 1957).
282 See Simma, supra note 11, at 582-83; Lauterpacht, supra note 213, at 67.
283 Santacroce, supra note 11, at 142 (“if a given provision ‘A’ in an international
investment agreement can be taken to mean ‘x’, ‘y’ and ‘z’, and the meanings ‘x’, ‘y’ and ‘z’
can be placed in a scale where ‘x’ is the meaning that is most consistent with a relevant human
rights norm ‘B’, the tribunal should take the provision ‘A’ to mean ‘x’, rather than ‘y’ or ‘z’);
See Pauwelyn, supra note 110, at 550-51 (discussing a similar scenario in the context of the
WTO).
284 Stratos Pahis, Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Human Rights Law:
Harmonization through Interpretation, International Commission of Jurists 10 (2012),
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/treaties-law-interpretation-themetic-report2012.pdf; Santacroce, supra note 11, at 142.
285 See Pauwelyn, supra note 110, at 551.
286 ALVAREZ, supra note 20, at 464-66; see also Santacroce, supra note 11, at 143, 149.
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to the inherent elasticity of IIAs’ substantive guarantees, these standards may
be sufficiently malleable to accommodate a range of diverging
interpretations, depending on the particular circumstances of a dispute.287As
a general matter, this interpretive approach could rebut an overly pro-investor
interpretive presumption that prioritizes investor protection on top of other
non-economic regulatory interests. This is instrumental to achieving a more
balanced interpretation of IIAs that is more accommodative of a state’s right
to regulate in the public interests and its responsibilities to comply with
external human rights obligations.
In concreto, this interpretive approach of systemic integration may be
most relevant to contextualize the interpretations of FET and nondiscriminatory treatment guarantees under an IIA in light of relevant human
rights norms.
The FET standard is one of the most controversial substantive protective
guarantees under an IIA. As foreign investors’ “most preferred route” to
bring investment treaty arbitration, this standard “constitute[s] the bulk of
successful investment arbitration claims” in human rights and environmentrelated contexts.288 Also, the formulation of the FET standard in an IIA often
uses key terms that are imprecise, undefined, and open to interpretation (e.g.,
“fair” and “equitable”), offering little meaningful guidance as to its
normative content.289 Through arbitral case law, investment tribunals often
focus on a set of constitutive elements, including the investors’ legitimate
expectations, the stability and predictability of the host state’s legal
framework, transparency and procedural fairness, among others.290 Among
these elements, the principle of legitimate expectations not only is seen as a
substantive component of the FET standard, but typically serves to inform
tribunals’ interpretations of other substantive elements.291
Investment tribunals have approached these elements inconsistently. In
some decisions, tribunals tended to require the host state to maintain a
stringent, high standard of good governance, potentially exposing them to
liability for public interest regulations. For instance, in Tecmed v. Mexico,
the tribunal held that the investor could reasonably expect the host state to
“act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in
its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any
and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments.”292 While not
ALVAREZ, supra note 20, at 464-66.
Choudhury, supra note 10, at 45-46; Bellak & Leibrecht, supra note 27, at 132.
289 Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health Regulation/Assessing
Liability Under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 38 (2011).
290 Id. at 39-41.
291 Id. at 40.
292 Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003);
see also Metaclad v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶¶ 27, 76 (Aug. 30,
2000) (“all relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and
successfully operating investments should be capable of being readily known to all affected
287
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prohibiting the exercise of the right to regulate by a host state, this approach
in fact requires an almost unrealistically high level of transparency and
procedural fairness that only a few (if any) states could ever achieve.293
Further, in Enron v. Argentina, CMS v. Argentina, and Suez v. Argentina,
tribunals found Argentina violative of the FET standard for making
regulatory changes that altered the legal framework relied on by the
investors.294 These instances led to concerns that investors’ legitimate
expectations can be treated as something akin to a stabilization clause or a
right of immutability, enabling investors to “reasonably” expect the legal
framework to be “frozen” since investment is made.295
Application of the principle of systemic integration could bring in the
host state’s human rights obligations to qualify and counterbalance investors’
legitimate expectations, preventing the latter from unduly impeding the
state’s right to regulate public interests. Indeed, an investor’s “legitimate
expectations” should reflect what it is “only reasonably entitled to assume”
in a particular context, and in light of a host state’s concurrent obligations of
human rights towards its own population.296 And it is questionable that the
host state has silently and implicitly “traded away their inherent rights to
regulate in the public interest” simply by ratifying an IIA.297 In times of a
public emergency or when knowing a new health peril, a host state cannot be
reasonably expected to promise not to regulate in the public interests and to
adapt its legal framework to the new circumstances, since such an expectation
is neither reasonable nor legitimate. By integrating relevant human rights
obligations into the notion of “legitimate expectations,” tribunals could
balance investors’ economic interests with a host state’s right to regulate in
the public interests.298 In essence, this approach requires adjudicators to
accord due interpretive weight to the human rights obligations of the host state
when assessing the “legitimate expectations” of both parties. Under this
approach, a host state can more forcefully defend its regulatory measures
deployed to comply with its human rights obligations.
This sensitive approach to the “legitimate expectations” doctrine is
manifested in Urbaser v. Argentina. In response to the FET claim that the
changed regulatory framework had violated investors’ legitimate
investors of a Party and that there should be no room for doubt or uncertainty on such
matters”).
293 Zachary Douglas, Nothing If Not Critical for Investment Arbitration: Occidental,
Eureko, Methanex, 22 ARBITRATION INT’L 27, 28 (2006) (arguing that this approach imposed
too stringent a standard, as it enabled investors to expect “perfect public regulation in a perfect
world, to which all states should aspire but very few (if any) will ever attain”).
294 Enron v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 259-68 (May 22, 2007);
CMS, ¶¶ 273-81; Suez, ¶¶ 222-48; see also Choudhury, supra note 10, at 46-47.
295 Choudhury, supra note 10, at 47.
296 ALVAREZ, supra note 20, at 465.
297 Id.
298 Michele Potesta, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law, 28 ICSID REV. 88,
122 (2013).

53

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:1 (2021)

expectations, the tribunal found that under the FET standard the investors
cannot reasonably expect the regulatory framework (prevailing when the
investment was made) to remain absolutely unchanged, save for the existence
of specific commitments made to the investors to that effect.299 Instead,
according to the tribunal, the investors’ legitimate expectations should be
determined in the context of the host state’s economic and social
environment, taking into account the state’s “leeway to issue regulations for
reason of public order or interest.”300 Moreover, the tribunal underscored
Argentina’s human rights obligations to “ensure the population’s health and
access to water and to take all measures required to that effect.”301 It further
reasoned that when a state took measures to implement such a fundamental
right to water, these measures “cannot hurt the fair and equitable treatment
standard because their occurrence must have been deemed to be accepted by
the investor[s] when entering into the investment,” and hence are within the
latter’s legitimate expectations.302 Therefore, the tribunal concluded that
Argentina’s human rights obligations to ensure the right to water constituted
“part of the investment’s legal framework” that the investors should have
already reasonably assumed, such that the latter cannot “invoke the
protection of [their] own interests as a prevailing objective.”303
Another entry point for human rights norms may be found in the
national (or most-favored-nation) treatment standard under an IIA. This
standard requires the host state to grant foreign investors and their
investments treatment no less favorable than that accorded to comparable
domestic investors and their investments.304 In this determination, a tribunal
is typically required to (1) identify the relevant domestic entities considered
to be “in like circumstances” with the foreign investor for comparison, and
(2) assess whether the foreign investor received less favorable treatment than
the domestic comparators.305 The key question is often whether
implementation of the disputed measure is based on a legitimate public policy
objective: if there is a legitimate policy ground for the state to distinguish the
investor from its domestic comparators, then they are not “in like
circumstances” (such that this claim should fail).306 In this inquiry, a state’s
human rights obligations could become highly relevant to inform the “in like
Urbaser, ¶¶ 591-92.
Id. ¶ 594.
301 Id. ¶ 622.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPHER SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 178-86 (2008).
305 Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 289, at 57; see, e.g., Pope & Talbot v. Canada,
UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶¶ 73-104 (Apr. 10, 2001).
306 Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 289, at 57; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 304; Pope
& Talbot, ¶ 79; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000), ¶
250.
299
300
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circumstances” analysis, since they may provide legitimate public policy
grounds to accord differential treatment.
A case in point is Foresti v. South Africa. In that case, the investors
(several Italian and a Luxembourg granite firms) challenged South Africa’s
black economic empowerment (BEE) policies (i.e., affirmative action
measures designed to address racial inequalities arising from the postapartheid era), posing novel questions of how to reconcile IIA commitments
with a state’s human rights obligations towards historically disadvantaged
groups.307 The investors claimed for violation of national treatment, among
others, apparently arguing that the state’s BEE measures (imposing
mandatory quotas for hiring black management personnel in the mining
sector) had de facto discriminated against foreign investors, since domestic
black-owned enterprises that had already satisfied such obligations would
obtain more favorable treatment.308 It bears noting that, as with the BITs
between South Africa and other European countries, the underlying BITs
contained no express language in the national treatment provisions dealing
with human rights or ensuring the policy space to adopt such affirmative
action measures.309
While this case had eventually been settled, it is still worth pondering
how to reconcile competing norms in this specific scenario. Despite the
treaties’ silence on human rights, it is important to engage in systemic
integration to construe the national treatment provisions in light of relevant
human rights law, with an eye to achieving a harmonious interpretation.
Under international human rights law (including the ICCPR and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination), affirmative actions are not illegal, and are even required by
the principle of equality, to the extent that they are necessary to correct
discrimination towards historically disadvantaged persons.310 As such,
“certain preferential treatment in specific matters as compared with the rest
307 Piero Foresti et al. v. South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/1, Award (Aug. 4, 2010);
Annika Wythes, Investor-State Arbitrations: Can the “Fair and Equitable Treatment” Clause
Consider International Human Rights Obligations?, 23 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 241, 243-44
(2010); Luke Eric Peterson, South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties: Implications for
Development and Human Rights, 27-28 (Nov. 2006), http://library.fes.de/pdf- files/iez/global/
04137-20200117.pdf.
308 Peterson, supra note 307, at 27-28; Wythes, supra note 307, at 243-44.
309 See Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the
Government of the Italian Republic on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, S. Afr.It., art. 3(1)-(2), Jun. 6, 1997; Agreement between Belgium—Luxembourg Economic Union
and the Republic of South Africa Concerning Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investments, B.L.E.U.-S. Afr., art. 3(2)-(3), Aug. 14, 1998; Agreement on Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, S. Afr.-Neth., art. 3(2), (6), May 9, 1995.
310 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 18: (Non-discrimination), 37th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1., ¶ 10 (adopted Nov. 10, 1989); International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, United Nations Gen. Assembly, arts. 1(4),
2(2), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 216, 218 [hereinafter CERD].
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of the population” could constitute “a case of legitimate differentiation”
under international human rights law.311 A regulatory distinction based on
such external human rights rules should be duly considered in an investment
tribunal’s “in like circumstances” analysis,312 and thus could justify what
would otherwise be an IIA breach. Otherwise, the IIAs invoked would make
a state strictly liable for any de facto less favorable treatment of foreign
investors, foreclosing the government’s bona fide exercise of the right to
regulate to diminish or eliminate domestic discrimination.
IV. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THIS APPROACH AND
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS IN NEW IIAS
Thus far, this article has studied application of human rights law as the
substantive law, in efforts to integrate considerations of human rights in
investment arbitration. This Part provides a critical review of this approach
(in Section A) and turns to new IIA provisions for potential solutions (in
Section B).
A. A Critical Reflection of This Approach
Not all human rights arguments are treated equally. Instead, investment
tribunals seem more inclined to entertain the jurisdictional/admissibility
defense and compensation defense. In contrast, successful instances of
counterclaims are rare and exceptional—and in those cases, they were based
on domestic law (rather than international law).313 As of this writing, Urbaser
v. Argentina seems to be the only case where a tribunal had ruled on the
merits of a human rights-based counterclaim. Though it eventually dismissed
the claim, the tribunal’s favorable findings on jurisdiction and admissibility,
as well as its recognition in obiter dicta that negative obligations of human
rights norms may also bind investors are a remarkable step forward. Yet, to
the extent that international human rights law (particularly, social and
economic rights) primarily binds sovereign states (as opposed to private
actors), it seems difficult to envisage a successful human rights-based
counterclaim, except for egregious violations of the negative obligations
thereof.
As regards the conflict of norms defense and interpretive tools of human
rights law, tribunals seem to have shown different attitudes. While arbitrators
are generally more receptive to resorting to external human rights norms
CERD, supra note 310, at 216.
Alternatively, through application of the principle of systemic integration (enshrined in
art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT), the negative presumption thereunder directs a tribunal to interpret
the national treatment provisions in ways that are consistent with South Africa’s international
human rights obligations to correct racial discrimination. See Simma, supra note 11 at 58586.
313 Ishikawa, supra note 2, at 37 (“Even when jurisdiction over counterclaims is
established, counterclaims have rarely succeeded on their merits, with the important
exceptions of Burlington v. Ecuador and Perenco v. Ecuador. These cases are highly
exceptional in that the claimant investors actually consented to jurisdiction over the host
state’s counterclaims based on the former’s breach of its own domestic law.”).
311
312
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(such as the right to water) as interpretive tools to contextualize and qualify
investment protection obligations under IIAs, they have yet to show
equivalent willingness to seriously engage with the conflict of norms defense
that a given human rights norm should prevail.314 When dealing with the
latter defense, tribunals instead tended to sidestep and downplay the human
rights of the host state’s population, and typically found no normative
conflicts in the first place, in that the host state should comply with both IIA
and human rights obligations simultaneously.315 Along with the host state’s
reluctance to fully develop this line of defense, this disinclination by
investment tribunals to genuinely address such arguments makes it
particularly difficult for human rights obligations to override relatively wellestablished investment protection standards.
Among the affirmative defenses examined, both the legality
requirement (jurisdictional/admissibility defense) and contributory fault
(compensation defense) provide important legal means to discipline investor
misconduct, echoing the moral logic of the “clean hands” doctrine that “[h]e
who seeks equity must come with clean hands.”316 Though the existence of
the clean hands doctrine under general international law is controversial,317
the implicit legality requirement and contributory fault doctrine function to
hold investors seeking redress accountable for their own wrongdoings
(including illegality per se and lack of due diligence) with respect to the
subject matter, seemingly presenting concrete manifestations of the “clean
hands” doctrine in international investment law.
Yet, there are important differences between these two doctrines. The
legality requirement produces a binary outcome (either denial of IIA
protections or not), and typically only applies to the establishment phase of
the investments. In contrast, contributory fault not only applies to all phases,
but also incorporates a notion of proportionality to apportion liability, thus
providing a more nuanced approach to addressing investor misconduct.
Further, the investor misconduct sanctionable under contributory fault
includes not only unlawful acts in breach of international or domestic law,
but also imprudent conduct evincing a lack of due diligence to take care of
one’s own rights or interests.318 Given these differences, the legality
requirement seems to be more suitable to deal with grave and serious
violations of human rights by precluding IIAs’ protections altogether. In
contrast, contributory fault is a more flexible doctrine. By weighing the
See supra Section III.B.(C) and Section III.D.
Broude & Henckels, supra note 9, at 103-04. See supra Section III.B.(C).
316 Aloysius Llamzon, Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation: The
State of the “Unclean Hands” Doctrine in International Investment Law: Yukos as Both
Omega and Alpha, 30 ICSID REV. 315, 316, 325 (2015).
317 John Dugard (Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection), Sixth Rep. on Diplomatic
Protection, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/546, ¶ 18 (Aug. 11, 2004); Llamzon, supra note 316, at 317.
318 See supra Section III.B(B).
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proportion of each party’s faulty contribution to the injury suffered,
contributory fault is especially appropriate to address situations where all
parties have engaged in some illegal conduct or wrongdoings.319
In sum, by systemizing human rights-grounded affirmative defenses,
counterclaims, and interpretive tools, this article seeks to provide a layered
approach to integrating human rights considerations into investment
arbitration. By giving effect to external human rights norms in investor-state
treaty arbitration, this approach aims to discipline investor wrongdoings with
respect to human rights, balance investment protection with public interests,
and safeguard a host state’s regulatory autonomy to advance human rights.
As such, application of human rights law could help to alleviate the
normative conflicts between competing interests, contribute to a more
balanced and legitimate international investment law, and incentivize foreign
investors to comply with human rights norms.
However, despite these potentials, this juridical approach is subject to
its own constraints and limitations.
First, given that the normative content of certain rules of general
international law is relatively unclear and ambiguous, their application may
generate uncertainties and contestations, which would constrain their
effectiveness. As noted earlier, due to the vagueness surrounding the
principles of lex posterior, lex specialis, as well as their inter-relationship,
traditional international rules on conflict of norms may provide insufficient
guidance to determine whether a human rights norm could prevail over an
IIA provision in a specific dispute.320 Partly owing to such a murky legal
basis, a conflict of norms defense has yet to prevail in any publicly known
investment arbitrations.
In addition, while generally favoring the applicability of the
contributory fault doctrine, general international law fails to provide specific
guidance on its invocation, leaving significant discretion to tribunals on its
application. Given that some arbitrators might be less willing to apply
contributory fault to discipline investor misconduct, this legal fuzziness has
contributed to tribunals’ inconsistent reliance on this doctrine and incoherent
approaches to investor misconduct, undermining the predictability and
certainty of investment law jurisprudence on this doctrine.321
319 See Andrew T. Bulovsky, Promises Unfulfilled: How Investment Arbitration Tribunals
Mishandle Corruption Claims and Undermine International Development, 118 MICH. L. REV.
117 (2019) (arguing that invoking the legality requirement to deny an IIA’s protections for
investments made through corruption and bribery would eventually reward, if not incentivize,
the host state government officials for soliciting or accepting bribes, as it unfairly shifts all of
the adverse consequences on the bribe-giver, such that this is not a proper means to enforce
investor obligations not to bribe).
320 See supra Section III.B(C) (discussing a conflict of norms defense).
321 See Marcoux & Bjorklund, supra note 47, at 879-80, 888-900 (discussing tribunals’
inconsistency in applying contributory fault, including their disagreement on whether this
doctrine could preclude state liability or can only reduce
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The second constraint relates to international human rights law itself.
As noted earlier, international human rights law is vertical in nature,
predominantly imposing legal duties on states (rather than private entities and
individuals) to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights.322 Moreover, due to
significant political opposition, as of today international instruments seeking
to establish standards of corporate conduct for business enterprises operating
abroad remain informal “soft law” lacking binding legal effects.323 Taken
together, it remains difficult for tribunals to directly enforce human rights
obligations on investors in investment arbitration, whether through
invocations of the legality requirement, contributory fault, or counterclaims.
Even for arbitrators willing to give effect to investor misconduct, their hands
might be significantly constrained by such legal lacunae at the international
level. In short, absent binding investor obligations as a matter of applicable
law, international human rights law seems to be too blunt a tool to adequately
address investor wrongdoings in investment treaty arbitration.324
Further, as stated, some positive human rights obligations with respect
to people’s social and economic rights are general in nature, nebulous in
scope, and imprecise in normative content, compared with substantive
investment protective guarantees under an IIA.325 In particular, for emerging
human rights norms—such as the rights to water or health—investment
arbitrators may find it difficult to grapple with their normative content, not
to mention directly apply these external sources to supersede relatively
settled investment protection obligations.326 This is all the more so for
arbitrators who only specialize in commercial arbitration and private
international law—yet, even public international lawyers focusing on
international investment or trade law (but not human rights law) might feel
uncomfortable interpretating such a novel human rights issue.327 Coupled
with the uncertainties of certain cutting-edge human rights norms, such a
mismatch of legal expertise can partly explain some arbitrators’ general
hesitance to render a detailed discussion on human rights issues implicated.
Finally, the adjudicative powers of investment arbitral tribunals are
subject to an inherent constraint—their limited mandate. After all, in an
investment treaty arbitration system that is heavily reliant on issues raised by
the disputing parties, whether and to what extent a tribunal could address the
human rights issues concerned largely hinges on whether and how a
damages, their divergent positions on whether its application is at the merits or quantum phase
or a matter of causation, some tribunals’ decisions not to rely on contributory fault when they
should, among others); compare Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, supra note 180, with South
American Silver v. Bolivia, supra note 196 (taking a too strict approach on causation).
322 See supra Section II.A.
323 Id.
324 See El-Hosseny & Devine, supra note 121, at 112-13.
325 See supra Section III.B.(C).
326 Id.
327 ALVAREZ, supra note 20, at 467-68.
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respondent state would make human rights arguments. Concerned with
creating “a widely publicized legal precedent obligating them to respect such
human rights as a matter of international law,” states, however, might hesitate
to raise full-blown human rights defenses in investment treaty arbitration.328
Also, both investors and states “might have an interest in keeping this
mechanism as a relatively expeditious, less expensive, and less politicized
forum for the resolution of economic disputes.”329 While civil societies and
NGOs can occasionally intervene as amici curiae to voice human rights
concerns, that the respondent state itself keeps reticent on human rights issues
or throws half-hearted human rights arguments could lead tribunals to doubt
whether the challenged measures were genuine good faith efforts to pursue
legitimate public interests in the first place. Instead, tribunals might be
inclined to treat such human rights arguments as a pretext that merely attempt
to shield the government from responsibilities for breaching investment
protection standards.
Likewise, while tribunals indeed could engage in systemic integration
to harmonize their interpretation of an IIA with human rights, in so doing
they cannot exceed the confined boundary of treaty interpretation, which, by
definition, is distinct from treaty modification.330 Otherwise, international
tribunals risk overstepping and assuming the role of states as the treatymakers, in the same ways that judges are acting like national legislators.331
For instance, where the IIA explicitly stipulates that compensation should
“be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment[s],”332
it is controversial for tribunals to deviate from the full compensation formula
but instead “invent” a formula designed to reflect the differentiated
responsibilities of the host state commensurate with its current material
resources and human rights obligations.333 Notwithstanding its normative and
policy value, such an innovative proposal is better perceived to be within the
province of treaty parties, given the proper demarcation of authorities
between treaty parties and international adjudicators. Had states really
intended to make such a new rule, they should explicitly establish it in an IIA
ex ante. Going too far, tribunals may not only depart from their limited
mandate, but also disrupt the power balance allocated between treaty parties
and international adjudicators, generating excessive uncertainty and
unpredictability to undercut the legitimate expectations of investors and
328

B.(C).

Id. at 467; see Simma & Kill, supra note 2, at 680 n.11; see also supra Section III.

ALVAREZ, supra note 20, at 467.
See VCLT, supra note 271; compare arts. 31-32, with arts. 39-41.
331 Particularly, Alvarez noted that some “arbitrators or judges see themselves as deciding
only the narrow dispute before them and do not believe that they are authorized to serve as
systemic law-makers for the international community.” See Alvarez, supra note 16, at 22224.
332 E.g., NAFTA, ch. 11, art. 1110(2).
333 See ALVAREZ, supra note 20, at 460.
329
330
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states.
Further, while a host state may nominally “win” a case, this might not
mean that its regulatory powers are adequately safeguarded. Given that a
prevailing state in investment treaty arbitration could only recover cost
awards (which sometimes cannot even fully cover the litigation and
arbitration costs spent), being dragged into investor-state proceedings (often
criticized for being too long and costly) may result in a pyrrhic victory, as
eventually a state might still have to spend significant costs to successfully
defend public interest regulations.334 Moreover, as noted earlier, investors
may strategize to threaten bringing investment claims as leverage, in attempts
to obtain secret settlements to their favor, or to delay, discourage, or even
thwart public interest regulations in the host state or third states.335 Such
settlements may “involve either significant monetary relief for the investor
. . . or significant adjustment of the regulatory framework to the benefit of the
investor.” 336 To the extent that these problems persist, it is difficult to
envisage that the risk of “regulatory chill” could be readily dispelled by a
judicial approach alone.
Therefore, under such institutional constraints identified, adjudicators’
ex post rebalancing of competing interests may still prove inadequate to
eradicate conflicts arising from implementation of an IIA and human rights
obligations in extreme situations. Despite tribunals’ sensitivity to human
rights, where a state is limited by its financial means at disposal or is
experiencing a grievous economic crisis (or a national emergency),
application of an IIA may render it difficult for the government to fully
realize the economic and social rights of its population.337
B. Potential Solutions in New IIAs
Given the limitations of general international law, international human
rights law, and international adjudication, it is worth asking how carefully
crafted IIA provisions could help to address these inadequacies and sharpen
this human rights law-based judicial approach, both at the substantive and
procedural levels. Focused on three notable trends of recent development,
this Section turns to new IIA examples to look for potential solutions.
First, unlike the majority of IIAs predominantly focused on investment
protection and state liability, there emerges a trend of new IIAs incorporating
an element of investor responsibility into the treaty language. Though in most
cases the treaty provisions used inspirational language to create “soft”
standards,338 there are some IIAs that contained hardened investor
334 Choudhury, supra note 10, at 35-36 (noting that albeit prevailing in Chemtura v.
Canada, Canada was only awarded USD 6 million in costs, a sum inadequate to cover its USD
9 million litigation costs). Id. (“Canadian taxpayers thus bore USD 3 million in costs for the
government to defend its efforts to protect public health.”).
335 See supra Section II.A.
336 Howse, supra note 30, at 65.
337 See Paparinskis, supra note 39, at 1246-47.
338 Choudhury, supra note 10, at 53; see, e.g., Agreement between the Government of
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obligations. A notable example is the draft Pan African Investment Code
(PAIC).
In addition to requiring investors to comply with national “laws,
regulations, administrative guidelines and policies,” article 22 of the PAIC
provides that investors “shall . . . ensure that they do not conflict with the
social and economic development objectives of the host [s]tates” and “shall
contribute to the economic, social and environmental progress with a view to
achieving sustainable development.”339 Further, the PAIC requires investors
to “support and respect the protection of internationally recognized human
rights” and to “ensure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.”340
It also obliges investors to “protect the environment” and “take reasonable
steps” to remedy damages caused by their activities to the environment “as
far as possible,” as well as to “respect labour rights.”341 Finally, the PAIC
requires investors to respect the rights of local populations and prohibits
investors from carrying out land-grabbing practices against local
communities.342
A more comprehensive approach was adopted by the Morocco-Nigeria
Bilateral Investment Treaty (Morocco-Nigeria BIT), which has established
an elaborate system of investor responsibilities. In terms of pre-establishment
duties, this treaty not only imposes anti-corruption obligations on
investors,343 but also requires investors to “conduct a social impact
assessment of the potential investment,” and to “comply with environmental
assessment screening and assessment processes” in accordance with
applicable laws of the home state or host state (whichever is more rigorous)
prior to making an investment.344 Moreover, the agreement breaks new
ground by establishing investors’ “post-establishment obligations”: article 18
obliges investors to “uphold human rights in the host state,” comply with the
“core labour standards as required by the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Canada and the Government of Burkina Faso for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Can.-Burk. Faso, art. 16, Apr. 20, 2015; Treaty between the Republic of Belarus and the
Republic of India on Investments, Belr.-India, art. 12, Sept. 24, 2019; Model Text for the
Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 12, Dec. 28, 2015 [hereinafter Indian Model BIT];
Agreement between the Argentine Republic and Japan for the Promotion and Protection of
Investment, Arg.-Japan, art. 17, Dec. 1, 2018; Investment Agreement between the Government
of Australia and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People’s Republic of China, Austl.-H.K., art. 16, Mar. 26, 2019; Investment Cooperation and
Facilitation Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of
Malawi, Braz.-Malawi, art. 9, Jun. 26, 2015; Cooperation and Facilitation Investment
Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the United Arab Emirates, Braz.UAE, art. 15, Mar. 15, 2019.
339 DRAFT PAN AFRICAN INVESTMENT CODE, art. 22, Dec. 2016 [hereinafter PAIC].
340 Id. art. 24.
341 Id. arts. 37(3), 20(1).
342 Id. art. 23.
343 Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, Morocco-Nigeria, art. 17,
Dec. 3, 2016 [hereinafter Morocco-Nigeria BIT].
344 Id. art. 14.
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Principles and Rights of Work, 1998,” and refrain from managing or
operating “the investments in a manner that circumvents international
environmental, labour and human rights obligations to which the host state
and/or home state are Parties.”345 In addition, this treaty also requires
investors to comply with “national and internationally accepted standards of
corporate governance for the sector involved, in particular for transparency
and accounting practices,” and to implement local community liaison
processes “in accordance with internationally accepted standards.”346
These provisions of the Morocco-Nigeria BIT seem to be largely
modelled on the Economic Community of Western African States
Supplementary Act on Investments (ECOWAS) and the Southern African
Development Community Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (SADC Model
BIT), each of which devoted a standalone chapter to providing similar
investor obligations.347
Another approach is to incorporate external international soft law
instruments into an IIA. In this regard, a rare, yet notable, example is the
Netherlands Model Investment Agreement. As provided by article 23 of that
treaty, investors’ compliance with its commitments under the UN Guiding
Principles on Businesses and Human Rights (UNGPs) and the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines) is a factor to be
considered by tribunals when determining damages.348 Likewise, IIAs may
incorporate more sector-specific international standards of conduct for
business enterprises, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of
Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.349 Alternatively, a
host state could incorporate these international soft law instruments into
investment contracts concluded with a foreign investor. By making
compliance with these standards a factor to influence compensation or a
condition for accessing international arbitration, these international soft law
instruments could become hardened and enforceable.350
As such, these IIA provisions help to concretize the types of
wrongdoings that could constitute the legal bases of counterclaims,
contributory fault, and jurisdictional/admissibility challenges, providing

Id. art. 18(2)(3)(4).
Id. art. 19.
347 ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Investments, ch. III, arts. 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, Dec. 19,
2008 [hereinafter ECOWAS]; Southern African Development Community Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty, Part 3, arts. 10, 11, 13, 14-16, Jun. 2012 [hereinafter SADC Model BIT].
348 Netherlands Model Investment Agreement, art. 23, Mar. 22, 2019 [hereinafter
Netherlands Model Investment Agreement]; see infra note 359.
349 Jarrett, Puig & Ratner, supra note 125, at 8.
350 Id. (“[A]n investor’s access to arbitration might be conditioned on its having engaged
in due diligence to identify human rights risks in its operations and respond to them, as
required under UNGP Pillar II.”).
345
346
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greater clarity for tribunals to assess the conduct of the investors.351
Compared with current international human rights law, these investor
obligation provisions incorporated in IIAs could provide more tailor-made
rules to address investor misconduct, serving to fill the international
governance gaps on this matter. Thus, though a multilateral business and
human rights treaty is far from being politically feasible, incorporating
investor duties into IIAs provides a more viable alternative to establishing
binding and enforceable investor obligations with regards to human rights.352
Through the legal means of the legality requirement, contributory fault,
and counterclaims, these binding investor obligations could provide the
“teeth” that can really “bite,” such that investor misconduct with respect to
human rights could be directly sanctioned in investment arbitration. In the
long run, given their direct legal enforceability, these rules could incentivize
investors to voluntarily comply with their duties and contribute to responsible
investments in aid of development goals.
Second, a growing number of new IIAs are beginning to elaborate on
the legal consequences of investors’ failures to comply with their obligations,
consolidating “built-in” avenues to directly discipline investor misconduct
and enforce investor obligations in investment treaty arbitration. Most
notably, these avenues include counterclaims, contributory fault, and the
legality requirement.
As noted earlier, at least under a broad jurisdictional clause of an IIA,
counterclaims brought against investors are within investment tribunals’
competence.353 To further remove uncertainties, an IIA can directly specify
tribunals’ jurisdiction to hear counterclaims. For instance, the PAIC contains
a separate provision permitting a host state to bring a counterclaim before an
investment tribunal for damages or other relief arising from an investor’s
breach of its obligations under the treaty (including international and
domestic law obligations).354 Similar provisions can also be found in the
ECOWAS and the SADC Model BIT.355 These provisions could dispel
uncertainties over the jurisdictional basis of counterclaims. Given that these
IIAs have also incorporated binding investor obligations, the admissibility
requirement could also be met easily, since counterclaims based on an
identical treaty are generally deemed to be strongly connected to an
investor’s IIA claims.356
Regarding contributory fault, three major approaches are noteworthy.
351 Marcoux & Bjorklund, supra note 47, at 903-04. For a different view cautioning risks,
see Jarrett, Puig & Ratner, supra note 125, at 8 (“[G]iven the open-textured nature of some of
the business responsibilities under Pillar II of the UNGPs . . . it may be difficult for a tribunal
to determine whether an investor has truly complied with its responsibilities.”).
352 Choudhury, supra note 5, at 20-21.
353 See supra Section II.C; see, e.g., Urbaser, ¶ 143.
354 PAIC, art. 43(2).
355 ECOWAS, art. 18(5); SADC Model BIT, art. 19.1.
356 See Shao, supra note 40, at 169-70.
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The first one is exemplified by the ECOWAS. As stipulated by article 18,
when investors fail to comply with their pre-establishment impact assessment
obligations or persistently breach their post-establishment obligations or
corporate governance obligations, the tribunals should consider whether this
breach is “materially relevant to the disputing issues,” and, “if so, what
mitigating or off-setting effects this may have on the merits of a claim or on
any damages award.”357 Likewise, the SADC Model BIT and PAIC contain
similar provisions to that effect.358 Through explicit terms, these provisions
require tribunals to consider application of contributory fault to offset
damages awarded to an investor, and to factor in an investor’s failure to
mitigate damages.
The second approach was featured in article 23 of the Netherlands
Model Investment Agreement. As noted earlier, it stipulates that when
determining the amount of compensation, tribunals are expected to take into
account an investor’s non-compliance with its commitments under the
UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines.359 Notably, the UNGPs provide that
enterprises should refrain from infringing on others’ human rights and avoid
causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts.360 The UNGPs
further stipulate that corporations should have in place human rights due
diligence processes to prevent, mitigate, and remedy adverse human rights
impacts of their activities.361 Indeed, given the “soft law” nature, the UNGPs
alone are unable to establish binding investors’ obligations under
international law, and are legally unenforceable. However, when linked with
application of contributory fault, these rules become part of the normative
framework that tribunals should consider and implement, providing external
standards to assess the investors’ misconduct. Under this provision of the
Netherlands Model Investment Agreement, we may expect more frequent
invocations of contributory fault to enforce investor obligations, as well as
more precedents like MTD, Copper Mesa, and Bear Creek.
The third one was taken in the Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty
(Indian Model BIT). Under article 26.3, the treaty provides that when
calculating monetary damages, tribunals should reduce damages, taking into
account mitigating factors (including any unremedied harm or damage
caused by the investor to the environment or local community, and “other
ECOWAS, art. 18(2)(4).
BIT, art. 19(1) (providing a similar provision addressing investors’ failure
to comply with their obligations under this agreement); PAIC, art. 43(1) (providing a similar
provision addressing investors’ failure to comply with their obligations under this instrument
or other relevant rules and principles of domestic and international law).
359 2019 Netherlands Model Investment Agreement, art. 23; see supra note 348.
360 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31UNGPs, arts. 11-13 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNGPs].
361 Id. art. 15.
357

358 SADC Model
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relevant considerations regarding the need to balance public interest and the
interests of the investor”).362 Though this provision itself does not provide a
clear standard to assess the investors’ conduct, the treaty contains other
provisions on investor obligations. Those provisions require investors to
comply with domestic laws, and encourage them to voluntarily incorporate
into their practices and internal policies international corporate social
responsibility principles relating to labor, the environment, human rights,
community relations, and anti-corruption.363
In a similar vein, article 19 of the 2018 Ecuadorian Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty (Ecuadorian Model BIT) obliges an investor to respect
“internationally recognized human and environmental rights and national
legislation” in “all supply chains and investment processes,” the breach of
which may entitle the host state to “proportional reparations” in accordance
with relevant rules of international and domestic law.364 Notably, this
provision not only mandates tribunals to apply contributory fault to enforce
investor responsibility in terms of human rights and environmental issues,
but also extends investors’ obligations to cover their supply chains. Such a
“supply chains” obligation of investors is very novel and far-reaching among
contemporaneous IIAs.365 Yet, given that what constitute “internationally
362 Indian Model BIT, art. 26.3 n.4. See also 2018 Ecuadorian Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, art. 17 (requiring tribunals to consider investor’s fault when determining the damages
caused (including environmental damage)) [hereinafter Ecuadorian Model BIT]. Javier
Jaramillo, New Model BIT proposed by Ecuador: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?,
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (July 20, 2018), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/07/20/
new-model-bit-proposed-e.
363 Indian Model BIT, arts. 11-12. For a critical view, see Duggal & Diamond, supra note
48, at 307 (arguing that “the 2015 Indian Model BIT does not refer to any specific standard,
such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines.
Therefore, the Indian approach will likely not give rise to concrete human rights obligations”)
(emphasis added). Indeed, it is worth noting that the initial draft of the 2015 Indian Model
BIT—2015 Draft Indian Model BIT—adopted a more sensitive approach to investor
obligations with respect to human rights and environmental protection in the host state. For
instance, article 12 of the 2015 Draft Indian Model BIT requires investors and investments to
comply with the law of the host state, including the law relating to human rights, labor
conditions, environmental protection, and conservation of natural resources, among others.
This provision also obliges investors and investments to “recognize the rights, traditions and
customs of local communities and indigenous peoples” in the host state. See Draft Model Text
for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 12, Mar. 15, 2015; Duggal & Diamond, supra
note 48, at 307 (noting that in contrast, the 2015 Indian Model BIT fails to make express
reference to human rights, the environment, local communities, or indigenous peoples in its
analogous provisions on investors’ obligations).
364 Tom Jones, Ecuador Aims to Balance State and Investor Rights with Model BIT, LATIN
LAW. (Mar. 19, 2018), https://latinlawyer.com/ecuador-aims-balance-state-and-investorrights-model-bit.
365 Duggal & Diamond, supra note 48, at 308-09 (noting that “the 2019 Dutch Model BIT
. . . (also) indirectly address[es] the issue of supply chain management, as it specifically refers
to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which, in turn, oblige investors to avoid
adversely impacting human rights through activities in their supply chain”). See Dutch Model
Investment Agreement, art. 7; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, at 24,
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recognized human rights and environmental rights” is debatable, how this
provision would be enforced remains to be seen, and may largely depend on
the interpretation of this reference by tribunals, which might look to
international hard law and soft law on this matter.366 Also, with respect to
direct expropriation, the treaty provides that investors are entitled to obtain
“adequate compensation,” taking into account any unremedied damage
caused by the investment or investor to the environment or the local
community as well as “any other relevant consideration to achieve an
adequate balance between the public interest and the interests of the
investment or investor.”367 In this way, the direct expropriation provision
seems to have implicitly incorporated the element of contributory fault as
part of the compensatory formula to be applied.368
To be sure, even without IIA provisions explicitly referencing
contributory fault, tribunals could still apply this doctrine under customary
international law. However, through express language, these IIA provisions
oblige tribunals to apply contributory fault in appropriate cases to address
investor misconduct, thereby removing a perceived notion that invocation of
this doctrine is purely discretionary. This could help to avoid potential
controversy and contribute to more consistency and coherence in tribunals’
reliance on this doctrine.369
Counterclaims and contributory fault arguments could enable a host
state to obtain a “set-off” in the damages awarded to an investor if they
prevailed. Coupled with the preceding trend of IIAs incorporating investor
obligations, these legal avenues may help to mitigate the asymmetric
structure of investment treaty arbitration by permitting the host states to
enforce human rights, corporate social responsibilities, and environmental
obligations on foreign investors, serving to bridge the “gap between the lack
of effective mechanism to hold foreign investors accountable for their
conduct and the extensive protection” provided under IIAs.370 Further, these
built-in mechanisms could strengthen the rule-of-law elements of
international investment law, including accountability, access to justice,
para. 17. Yet, article 7 of the Dutch Model Investment Agreement was crafted in aspirational
language, stating that states “reaffirm the importance . . . to encourage investors . . . to
voluntarily incorporate into their internal policies . . . OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises.”
366 Duggal & Diamond, supra note 48, at 309.
367 Id. at 309; Javier Jaramillo, New Model BIT Proposed by Ecuador: Is the Cure Worse
ARB.
BLOG
(Jul.
20,
2018),
than
the
Disease?,
KLUWER
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/07/20/new-model-bit-proposed-ecuadorcure-worse-disease (noting that an illustrative list provided in the Ecuadorian Model BIT
includes “(i) the use of the investment; (ii) pending obligations of the investor; (iii) fault of
the investor in the damage caused; (iv) any type of environmental damage”).
368 It should be noted that this treaty does not protect against indirect expropriations. See
Jaramillo, supra note 362.
369 Marcoux & Bjorklund, supra note 47, at 901.
370 Ishikawa, supra note 2, at 33.
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fairness, and substantive values of fundamental human rights.371
Moreover, IIAs could further elucidate the conditions for invoking the
legality requirement, for instance, by explicitly specifying the jurisdictional
or admissibility prerequisites for accessing investment arbitration. Indeed, to
reduce uncertainties on the interpretation of IIA provisions, treaty parties
may ex ante determine whether a given conduct is so serious that the treaty
should decline investor claims.372 In this regard, the Ecuadorian Model BIT
breaks new ground by expressly qualifying the definition of the term
“investment.” In article 3(2), the treaty requires that a covered investment
must make a positive contribution to the human rights and the environment
in the host state.373 In this way, this agreement imposes a jurisdictional
obstacle to preclude enterprises or companies in breach of human rights and
environmental obligations from invoking treaty protection, a unique feature
rarely seen in other contemporary IIAs.374 In addition, IIAs might even attach
conditions to accessing international arbitration by requiring the investors to
fulfill their obligations not merely at the establishment phase, but also
throughout the course of the investment’s operation.375
Third, a growing number of recent IIAs have incorporated provisions
designed to strike a better balance between investment protection and the
sovereign right to regulate.
In the preambles, many IIAs have referenced the goals of sustainable
development376 or specified that investment protection and promotion should
not be achieved at the expense of human rights, public health, the
environment, safety, and labor standards.377 In the operative parts, many IIAs
Id.
Jarrett, Sergio & Ratner, supra note 125, at 7-8.
373 Jones, supra note 364; Jaramillo, supra note 362 (noting that article 3(2) imposes
additional requirement to establish the existence of an investment: “(i) respect for human
rights obligations; (ii) respect for environmental obligations; and (iii) subjection to national
legislation, which is tied to the condition that there are no acts of corruption in order for the
investment to exist”; and that “article 15(5) of the (BIT) includes the clean hands doctrine to
prevent arbitration for investors who commit acts of corruption”).
374 Duggal & Diamond, supra note 48, at 308.
375 Id. See Al Warraq v. Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 607 (Dec. 15, 2014)
(despite finding a FET breach, the majority award held that this claim was inadmissible for
the investor’s post-establishment breach of an IIA provision, which prohibits investors from
violating domestic laws and committing acts that may disturb public order or undermine public
interests). Admittedly, this position is a minority approach.
376 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Austl.Brunei-Can.-Chile-Japan-Malay.-Mex.-N.Z.-Peru-Sing.-Viet., pmbl., Mar. 8, 2018, [2018]
A.T.S. 23 [hereinafter CPTPP]; Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Islamic
Republic of Iran for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Iran-Slovk.,
pmbl., Jan. 1, 2016. Likewise, article 1(2) of the Ecuadorian Model BIT provides that “[t]he
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms enunciated in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and other international instruments . . . constitutes an essential element of
this Treaty.” See Duggal & Diamond, supra note 48, at 308.
377 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U, pmbl., Oct. 30, 2016; Free
371
372
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have stipulated a separate provision on the host state’s right to regulate. Such
a provision may be crafted in the specific context of environmental
regulations,378 or on a standalone basis—such as the Argentina-Qatar BIT
stipulating that all provisions of investment protection should not affect the
sovereign right to regulate “through measures necessary to achieve legitimate
policy objectives.” 379 Being declaratory in nature, these preambles and
“right-to-regulate” provisions cannot be directly invoked to preclude
application of investment protection provisions.380 However, they could
provide useful context to inform tribunals’ treaty interpretation when
assessing investors’ claims, since they indicate the treaty parties’ intention to
qualify the construction of IIA’s substantive guarantees. In this way, these
declaratory provisions could prompt arbitrators to accord greater interpretive
weight to states’ regulatory space to pursue public interests, making more
leeway for bona fide regulations in investment treaty arbitration.381
Further, to respond to the “diversion effects” of investor-state damage
awards, developing states may negotiate and bargain for some “special and
differentiated treatment” provisions in IIAs, which can require tribunals to
give due regard to the host state’s relative material resources, development
levels, and other international obligations when determining breaches of IIAs
or quantifying damage amounts.382 For instance, an IIA could mandate
tribunals to depart from the default rules to pay full compensation in
extraordinary circumstances where strictly following that formula may result
in crippling consequences to the host state’s national economy, and instead
provide that adjudicators can, if not should, factor in the state’s human rights

Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, E.U.-Sing.,
pmbl., Oct. 19, 2018; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment between the
Republic of Austria and the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Austria-Nigeria, pmbl., Apr.. 8, 2013.
378 See 2012 U.S. Model BIT, art. 12(5); The Dominican Republic—Central America—
United States Free Trade Agreement, Central America-Dom. Rep.-U.S., ch. 10, art. 10.11,
Aug. 5, 2004; Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Sultanate of Oman on the Establishment of a Free trade Area, Oman-U.S.,
art. 10.10, Jan. 19, 2006.
379 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments between the
Argentine Republic and the State of Qatar, Arg.-Qatar, art. 10, Nov. 6, 2016 (providing an
illustrative list of public policy goals including “public health, safety, the environment, public
morals, social and consumer protection”).
380 See AKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 104
(2014).
381 Choudhury, supra note 10, at 44. See Al Tamini v. Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33,
Award, ¶¶ 387-90 (Nov. 3, 2015); Aven, ¶ 412 (both tribunals interpreted the FET provisions
in light of the environment-specific right-to-regulate provisions contained in the IIAs: finding
that the former were essentially qualified by the latter, they concluded with more
environmental regulation-friendly interpretations).
382 Choudhury, supra note 10, at 59. Congyan Cai, Balanced Investment Treaties and
BRICS, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 191, 221 (2018).
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obligations to its citizens when determining damages.383 Aiming at
establishing differentiated levels of responsibility commensurate with
differing national capacities (among others), such a provision could make for
a more equitable approach to damage quantification, allowing greater room
for a host state to pursue broader development goals towards its population.
Moreover, some IIAs have gone further by ex ante shifting certain types
of regulatory measures from the decision-making of investment tribunals to
that of “either host states individually or the treaty parties collectively.”384
In this regard, the Morocco-Nigeria BIT contains a “self-judging” rightto-regulate provision, stipulating that “non-discriminatory measures”
adopted to comply with the host state’s “international obligations under other
treaties shall not constitute a breach under this Agreement.”385 On such terms,
this provision only allows tribunals to examine whether the disputed measure
is adopted in good faith (i.e., non-discriminatorily), precluding them from
assessing whether the adverse impacts on investors are proportionate to the
policy goals aimed at.
Likewise, during the discussion of the UNCITRAL Working Group on
investor-state dispute settlement reform, South Africa’s submission proposes
the inclusion of “public interest” exceptions in IIAs to exempt “public
interest laws, regulations and legislation” from investor-state arbitration
claims, ensuring that “investors are not able to challenge legitimate public
interest regulations.”386 It also advances the incorporation of a “supremacy
clause” in IIAs to the effect that investment protection shall not prevail over
“international social, environmental and human rights commitments” of a
host state in case of a conflict between these rules.387
In a similar vein, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and some Singaporean IIAs contain a
tobacco “carve-out,” refraining investors from bringing investor-state claims
over a host state’s tobacco regulatory measures.388 The Canada-China
investment agreement likewise provides that when a host state raises a
See CME v. Czech Republic, Separate Opinion on the Issues at the Quantum Stage by
Ian Brownlie, ¶¶ 75-80 (Mar. 14, 2003). See also Paparinskis, supra note 39, at 1246-53;
Martins Paparinskis, Crippling Compensation in the International Law Commission and
Investor-State Arbitration, ICSID Review, ICSID REV. (forthcoming, 2022).
384 Roberts, supra note 16, at 82.
385 Morocco-Nigeria BIT, art. 23(3). See SADC Model BIT, art. 20.3.
386 Submission from the Government of South Africa: Possible Reform of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS), UNCITRAL Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Reform) Thirty-Eighth Session, Oct. 2019, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.176, at
9, https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.176.
387 Id.
388 CPTPP, ch. 29, art. 29.5; Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Australia
and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, Austl.-Sing., ch. 8, art. 22, Feb. 17, 2003;
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of
the Republic of Singapore on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments, Kaz.Sing., 2018, art. 11(2), Nov. 21, 2018.
383
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defense concerning financial services, the investor-state tribunal cannot rule
on it, but should defer to the treaty parties’ decision-making, or, failing that,
to a decision by a state-to-state tribunal on this matter.389 Similarly, in its
investment chapter, the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement exempts nondiscriminatory regulatory measures for legitimate public welfare objectives
from investor-state treaty arbitration, but requires the treaty parties to provide
a binding decision to determine whether these measures are covered by this
exception.390
In addition, many IIAs now stipulate treaty parties’ joint interpretive
mechanisms to issue binding interpretations on an IIA provision, and allow
a non-disputing treaty party (i.e., the home state) to make submissions on
issues of treaty interpretation in pending investor-state arbitral proceedings,
thereby enabling treaty parties to play a more prominent role in interpreting
their own treaties. 391 Commentators also proposed establishing control
mechanisms to enable treaty parties to ex ante review arbitral awards
(through a “notice-and-comment-like” mechanism) and even to ex post veto
the awards (through a “legislative-veto-like” mechanism).392
In sum, these IIA provisions reviewed above indicate that many states,
having changed their perception of the risks inherent in investment treaty
arbitration, are re-contracting their treaties to correct the asymmetries of IIAs
and rebalance investment protection and public policy goals. Indeed, if the
normative conflicts between IIAs and human rights essentially reflect a lack
of coordination between different subfields of international law, then states—
as masters of their treaties—could and should strike a better balance between
competing interests by recalibrating their treaties and reconfiguring their
control over tribunals’ decision-making authority. Compared with arbitral
tribunals’ reconciliation on an ex post and ad hoc basis, treaty parties are
generally in a better position to rebalance public and private interests on an
ex ante and systemic basis. These illustrative instances could offer useful
templates, showing how investment treaty reforms could fix their own
pathologies and enhance the legitimacy of the entire system.
389 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-China,
arts. 20(2), 33(3), Sept. 9, 2012 [hereinafter 2012 Canada-China IIA].
390 Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of
the People’s Republic of China, Austl.-China, ch. 9, arts. 9.11.4-9.11.6, Jun. 17, 2015 (these
policy goals include “public health, safety, the environment, public morals of public orders”).
391 Roberts, supra note 16, at 82-83. See, e.g., 2012 Canada-China IIA, arts. 18(2), 27(2),
30; 2012 U.S. Model BIT, arts. 28(2), 30(3).
392 See, e.g., Yackee, supra note 1, at 434-44 (discussing the “notice-and-comment” control
mechanism that allows treaty parties to provide comments on the proposal of the final award,
which may influence the shape of the award, as well as the “legislative veto” control
mechanism that permits treaty parties to annul or overrule an undesirable award). See 2012
U.S. Model BIT, art. 28(9)(a); ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, BruneiCambodia-Indon.-Laos-Malay.-Myan.-Phil.-Sing.-Thai.-Viet., art. 36(7)-(8), Feb. 26, 2009.
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V. CONCLUSION
To address the backlash against investment treaty arbitration and
achieve good governance, investment tribunals should not ignore or
downplay non-economic issues, at least where the disputing parties raise
human rights arguments in the arbitration processes. Otherwise, the “publicprivate” divide may continue causing normative disruptions, undermining the
legitimacy of international investment law as a whole. In response, this article
provides a human rights-based approach for investor-state tribunals to
rebalance international investment law, reconciling competing private and
public interests. In this endeavor, it makes three contributions to the existing
literature.
First, different from the prevailing approach in search of “public law”
prescriptions, this article focuses on a relatively undertheorized public
international law dimension, exploring international law doctrines and legal
techniques to alleviate the potential conflicts between investment protection
and human rights. Through application of human rights law to investor-state
treaty disputes, considerations of human rights could enter the legal
bloodstream of investment treaty arbitration. Therefore, even if the
underlying IIA has not dealt with human rights up front, application of human
rights law can still enable tribunals to accommodate human rights interests
implicated and address investors’ misconduct in relation to human rights,
without overly relaxing the standards of investment protection.
Second, this approach reveals a new dimension of the relationship
between international investment law and international human rights law. As
part of public international law, international human rights law could
constitute the applicable law governing the substance of investment treaty
disputes, enabling human rights norms to productively interact with
international investment law. In this way, an investment tribunal can directly
apply human rights law to determine the merits of the dispute, either by
establishing an affirmative defense against state liability or by addressing a
counterclaim enforcing investors’ obligations. In particular, a host state could
invoke human rights arguments as a jurisdiction/admissibility defense, a
compensation defense, as well as a conflict of norms defense. Moreover, even
short of direct applicability, international human rights law could indirectly
serve as an interpretive tool to harmonize investment protection standards
with the human rights implicated. Through the process of systemic
integration, this interpretive approach could help ensure that investor
protection does not work as an absolute trump card, but instead should be
duly weighed against broader public interests concerned, thereby
recalibrating IIAs’ commitments and flexibility in treaty interpretation.
Third, this article critically reflects on the limitations of this human
rights law-based approach, with an eye to using carefully crafted IIA
provisions to remedy these aspects. These shortcomings include, most
notably, the ambiguities in some rules of general international law, the
vertical effects of international human rights law, as well as the inherent
limits of international adjudication. Given these inadequacies, states—as
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masters of their own treaties—could and should play a more prominent role
in re-contracting IIAs and reconfiguring their control over tribunals’
decision-making authority. By examining recent treaty provisions as
templates, this article sheds light on how IIAs can be improved to better
address the international governance gap on investor responsibility and
properly safeguard states’ regulatory powers to pursue public interests,
thereby achieving a more symmetric, balanced system of international
investment law.
Ideally, international investment law and international human rights law
could not only be reconciled, but also be mutually reinforcing. Indeed, they
are by no means “separate worlds” in clinical isolation from each other, and
investment treaty arbitration does not operate as a completely autonomous
“self-contained” regime immune from the dynamics of human rights.393
However, given the increasing tensions between investment treaty arbitration
and human rights, reconciling such normative conflicts in concreto requires
international adjudicators and states to strike a better balance among
investment protection, sovereign rights, and public interests at large.
Grounded in the broader normative backbone of public international law (in
which IIAs and investment treaty arbitration are embedded), this human
rights law-based approach could provide a framework for adjudicators and
states to better order the relationship between investment protection and
human rights, thereby contributing to greater legitimacy, accountability, and
rule-of-law attributes of international investment law.

393

Simma, supra note 11, at 576.
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